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Virtual Trials: Necessity, Invention, and the 
Evolution of the Courtroom 
SUSAN A. BANDES AND NEAL FEIGENSON† 
ABSTRACT 
Faith in the legitimating power of the live hearing or 
trial performed at the place of justice is at least as old as the 
Iliad. In public courtrooms, litigants appear together, 
evidence is presented, and decisions are openly and formally 
pronounced. The bedrock belief in the importance of the 
courtroom is rooted in common law, constitutional 
guarantees, and venerated tradition, as well as in folk 
knowledge. Courtrooms are widely believed to imbue 
adjudication with “a mystique of authenticity and 
legitimacy.” The COVID-19 pandemic, however, by 
compelling legal systems throughout the world to turn from 
physical courtrooms to virtual ones, disrupts and calls into 
question longstanding assumptions about the conditions 
essential for the delivery of justice. These questions are not 
merely tangential; they implicate many of the core beliefs 
undergirding the U.S. system of justice, including the whole 
notion of “a day in court” as the promise of a synchronous, 
physically situated event with a live audience. Rather than 
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regard virtual courts as just an unfortunate expedient, 
temporary or not, we use them as an occasion to reflect on 
the essential goals of the justice system and to re-examine 
courtroom practices in light of those goals. We draw on social 
science to help identify what can be justified after the myths 
are pared away. Focusing on three interrelated aspects of 
traditional courts—the display and interpretation of 
demeanor evidence; the courtroom as a physical site of 
justice; and the presence of the public—we prompt a 
reassessment of what our legal culture should value most in 
courtroom adjudication and what we are willing to trade off 
to achieve it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Faith in the legitimating power of the live hearing or 
trial performed at the place of justice is at least as old as the 
Iliad. Common-law societies have for centuries held it up as 
an exemplary form of adjudication and even as the “central 
institution of law as we know it.”1 In this form of 
adjudication, evidentiary hearings and trials are live events, 
conducted in dedicated spaces to which members of the 
public and the press generally have access,2 at which 
litigants appear at the same time and participate; evidence, 
especially testimony, is presented; and decisions are publicly 
and formally pronounced. And throughout, participants can 
observe one other as they variously testify, argue, watch, and 
listen. The liveness, momentousness, and visibility of 
hearings and trials are all components of the familiar 
metaphors of the courtroom as stage and the trial as theater, 
which remind us that an audiencee—in the courtroom 
gallery or watching at home—is always at least notionally 
part of the performance as well.3 The whole is greater than 
 
 1. ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 3 (2009) (quoting 
James Boyd White).  
 2. These are sometimes conducted remotely via broadcast or livestream, 
sometimes via media accounts featuring artists’ sketches. 
 3. As we readily acknowledge, much actual dispute resolution does not 
conform to this model of courtroom adjudication. First, many disputes are not 
decided on the basis of full, open hearings in traditional courts. The great 
majority of claims on or sanctions implemented by the government are 
adjudicated in quasi- or barely public administrative courts. A growing 
preponderance of claims between private parties are channeled by contract or by 
the courts into mediation or arbitration. Additionally, more than 95% of all 
formal civil and criminal cases ultimately settle (on the criminal side, via plea 
bargains), so that a full trial never occurs. See, e.g., JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS 
CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-
STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 306–22 (2011). Second, many routine 
matters in overwhelmed criminal and possibly other courts are disposed of by 
judges, prosecutors, and public defenders in ways that are at best hasty and 
bureaucratic. Nevertheless, over 150,000 trials took place every year in federal 
and state courts before the pandemic and many times that number of evidentiary 
hearings and other pretrial proceedings, so the model accurately describes a vast 
amount of adjudication, as well as the ideal generally held by legal professionals 
and laypeople alike. 
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the sum of the parts; the trial is credited with helping judges 
and jurors to transcend their individual interests and 
“recognize and act upon what is beyond their ordinary 
selves.”4 Yet if the trial is an “an act of practical integration 
that is crucial for the health of our society,”5 the COVID-19 
pandemic, with its unprecedented challenge to the viability 
of live hearings, leaves us no choice but to disassemble, 
scrutinize, and demystify the components of the trial in order 
to find a working solution that won’t irreparably delay or 
deny justice. 
The move to virtual hearings6 disrupts and calls into 
question longstanding assumptions about the conditions 
 
 4. Milner S. Ball, A Little Mistrust Now and Then, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 877, 
887 (1998) (cited in BURNS, supra note 1). 
 5. BURNS, supra note 1. 
 6. “Virtual hearings” and “virtual courts” encompass a variety of 
technologies and formats. Throughout this Article, we use these terms to refer to 
proceedings conducted entirely online via videoconferencing, of which Zoom is 
currently the most popular platform, see Anna-Leigh Firth, Two platforms 
dominated in our poll of virtual court operations, NAT’L JUD. C. (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.judges.org/news-and-info/two-platforms-dominated-in-our-poll-of-
virtual-court-operations/ (48% of responding judges reported they were using 
Zoom for virtual proceedings; WebEx second at 25%), where each participant may 
be physically located anywhere (although judges frequently preside while sitting 
alone in their courtrooms). These proceedings should be distinguished from those 
in traditional courtrooms where a single participant, typically a criminal 
defendant, an applicant for parole or asylum, or a vulnerable witness appears via 
video-link but everyone else is physically present in the courtroom. They should 
also be distinguished from the more technologically sophisticated “distributed 
courtroom,” which: 
uses a physical courtroom but allows for multiple parties to appear 
remotely. Rather than placing remote participants into frames on a 
single screen, this configuration displays remote participants (or groups) 
on separate screens arrayed around the physical courtroom. Remote 
participants similarly have multiple screens, and multiple cameras. . . . 
[T]his configuration [is referred to] as the “distributed courtroom” in that 
the monitors are distributed around the courtroom in the “correct” 
position. 
Court of the Future Network, Gateways to Justice II: Guidelines for Use of Video 
Links in Justice Hearings 11 (draft July 31, 2020). We recognize that even more 
sophisticated and technologically advanced sorts of alternative adjudicatory 
spaces, such as fully immersive virtual courtrooms, may be developed in the 
future. 
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essential for the delivery of justice. The stakes are most 
apparent in the criminal justice system, where courts must 
weigh the constitutional rights of the accused, including the 
rights to speedy trial, confrontation of witnesses, and an 
open courtroom, against concerns about public health and 
safety. But the questions raised by the pandemic affect the 
whole range of legal proceedings and interactions, including 
civil suits, administrative hearings, and appellate 
arguments. These questions are not merely tangential; they 
implicate many of the core beliefs undergirding the U.S. 
system of justice, including the whole notion of “a day in 
court” as the promise of a synchronous, physically situated 
event. When the legal status quo is confronted with an 
unprecedented challenge of this magnitude, one 
understandable impulse is to try to create a safer version 
(masks, plexiglass, social distancing)7 or, alternatively, an 
online simulacrum of the practices we know. 
But rather than concentrate all our efforts on recreating 
or returning to a pre-COVID status quo, we should make use 
of this forced pause to reconsider “what is necessary and 
what is possible.”8 In light of an increasingly rich body of 
science and social science, lessons from the U.S. experience 
and that of other legal systems, and the sheer necessity of 
the current crisis, we ought to seize this moment to re-
evaluate many arrangements that have long been taken for 
granted. 
The rules that govern and shape the U.S. courtroom 
experience arise from a complex blend of constitutional and 
statutory mandates, deeply rooted common-law traditions, 
 
 7. See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow & Justin Jouvenal, Courts dramatically rethink 
the jury trial in the era of the coronavirus, WASH. POST (July 31, 2020, 7:45 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/jury-trials-coronavirus/2020/ 
07/31/8c1fd784-c604-11ea-8ffe-372be8d82298_story.html. 
 8. Bruno Latour made this point in the context of the impact of the pandemic 
on climate change. Jonathan Watts, Bruno Latour: This is a global catastrophe 
that has come from within, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2020, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/06/bruno-latour-coronavirus-gaia-
hypothesis-climate-crisis. 
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beliefs (largely of the untested or unsupported variety) about 
human behavior, and a surprising amount of mysticism. For 
example, the centrality of demeanor evidence in the U.S. 
system is the product of a number of sources: textual 
guarantees like the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
common-law tradition of an open courtroom and its 
attendant rituals, the folk-knowledge belief that demeanor is 
a reliable indicator of credibility, and faith in the “elusive” 
power of “sense impressions.”9 A similar spectrum of text-
based rules, norms and rituals, beliefs about human 
behavior, and mysticism underlies much of courtroom 
practice. Courtrooms, in the words of the late legal and 
literary scholar Robert Ferguson, aim to create “‘an aura,’ a 
mystique of authenticity and legitimacy.”10 When 
proceedings are forced onto Zoom, Webex, or other virtual 
platforms, much if not all of that mystique or aura is likely 
to be stripped away. Should we mourn it? 
Common-law court systems seek to advance a range of 
values, including inclusivity, dignity, fairness, accuracy, 
transparency, and the demonstration of state authority. The 
traditional features of formal adjudication reflect these basic 
values and attempt to negotiate the tensions among them. 
We argue for a more explicit debate about the goals of 
adjudication, whether in physical or virtual courtrooms, so 
that we can determine how to achieve whatever it is we value 
most and what we are willing to trade off in pursuit of those 
goals. This will require demystifying some of the more 
opaque justifications offered for traditional practices, such as 
the oft-mentioned “intangible” and “imponderable” benefits 
of live, face-to-face testimony and the very “mystique” and 
“aura” of the courtroom itself. We will draw on science and 
social science to support our evaluations of the folk 
 
 9. Henry S. Sahm, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible 
Imponderables, 47 A.B.A. J. 580, 580 (1961); Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 
269 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 10. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, THE TRIAL IN AMERICAN LIFE 68 (2007). 
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psychology and mythology underlying customary beliefs 
about courtroom adjudication. 
We focus on three interrelated aspects of adjudication 
that seem likely to change dramatically as online hearings 
and trials become more and more prevalent.11 Part I will 
discuss the complex psychological dynamics of the 
courtroom, focusing on the display and interpretation of 
demeanor evidence. Part II will discuss the courtroom as a 
physical site of justice. Part III will discuss the notion of 
public access to the courtroom by present spectators, the 
press, and the broader public beyond the courtroom walls. 
We also offer the beginnings of a normative critique, 
suggesting how adjudication’s values and goals might be 
reassessed and rebalanced. 
  
 
 11. As this Article goes to press, many hearings and even a few fully online 
jury trials have already been conducted. See, e.g., Griffin v. Albanese Enterprise, 
Inc., No. 16-2019-CA-1555 (Fla. Cir. Ct. August 10, 2020) (Zoom jury trial in civil 
case). 
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I. DEMEANOR 
The Reigning Paradigm 
Like other common-law systems,12 the U.S. court system 
places tremendous faith in the importance of live witness 
testimony, given in open court.13 This preference is 
enshrined in the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause 
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.14 Live testimony 
has, since its inception, been intimately tied to a belief that 
personal observation is essential to the ability to evaluate 
demeanor, and to a belief in the importance of demeanor in 
the assessment of credibility and character. Demeanor 
evidence “relies heavily on the interpretation of facial 
expression and body language.”15 Access to witnesses’ 
demeanor is viewed as an aspect of fairness to the accused 
and as a sign of respect for the accused’s dignity: defendants 
deserve to be able to hear, see, and cross-examine the 
government’s witnesses. It is also an article of faith that 
access to demeanor helps decision-makers assess witnesses’ 
credibility and thus advances the core value of accurate 
judgment. As one defense attorney grappling with the use of 
surgical masks in the courtroom recently stated: “[I]f 
witnesses or jurors are allowed to wear masks, it could 
obscure key nonverbal cues during testimony and jury 
selection. ‘We need to be able to see someone’s face in order 
to judge their credibility’ . . . .”16 
 
 12. See Susan A. Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and the Consequences of 
Misinterpretation: The Limits of Law as a Window into the Soul, 3 J.L., RELIGION 
& ST. 170, 171 (2014) [hereinafter Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and 
Consequences]. See also supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Mark Bennett, The Changing Science of Memory and Demeanor–And 
What It Means for Trial Judges, 101 JUDICATURE 60, 61 (2017). 
 14. FED. R. CIV. P. 43 (“At trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken in 
open court unless a . . . statute . . . or other rule[] provide[s] otherwise.”); U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”). 
 15. Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and Consequences, supra note 12, at 172. 
 16. Marimow & Jouvenal, supra note 7.  
1284 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
These norms and beliefs about the perceived importance 
of demeanor evidence affect the evaluation of live testimony 
in multiple contexts. For example, judges evaluate 
defendants’ demeanor when setting bail and at sentencing. 
They observe the demeanors of parents and children in 
resolving custody disputes. They do so when deciding 
whether to deport an asylum seeker. At voir dire, lawyers 
and judges attend not only to what prospective jurors say in 
response to questions but to how they say it. Jurors in 
personal injury cases notice whether the plaintiff appears to 
be sitting uncomfortably in her chair or struggling to and 
from the witness stand. Jurors may take the judge’s tone of 
voice and nonverbal behavior as a cue to what the judge 
thinks, and therefore what they should think, about the 
witnesses and the evidence.17 And the press and public 
observing a trial may rely on witnesses’ and parties’ 
demeanors in reaching their own opinions about whether 
justice is being done. 
The Critique 
The Anglo-American belief in the power of demeanor 
evidence as a barometer of credibility, and even a window 
into “the heart and mind of the offender,”18 is tenacious and 
deeply held. Unfortunately, it is also heavily reliant on 
dubious folk knowledge. As Judge Frank Easterbook 
observed with his customary penchant for cutting to the 
chase: “The belief that many people form from watching 
television and movies—that [sifting honest, persecuted 
witnesses from those who are feigning] can be done by careful 
attention to a witness’s demeanor—has been tested and 
rejected by social scientists.”19 And for all its historical 
 
 17. See Peter David Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice: Judges’ Verbal 
and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985). 
 18. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 19. Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Judge 
Posner’s opinion in United States v. Wells, 154 F.3d 412, 414 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(“Judges fool themselves if they think they can infer sincerity from rhetoric and 
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pedigree and the fervent loyalty it commands, in-court 
evaluation of demeanor is not the only accepted means of 
adducing evidence. For example, some inquisitorial systems 
rely much more heavily on dossiers of documentary 
evidence.20 Even the pre-pandemic U.S. system has 
struggled with the issue of precisely how indispensable the 
usual access to demeanor evidence is, and has on occasion 
found it outweighed by other values; for example, child 
sexual assault victims are generally permitted to testify from 
behind a screen or via videoconference if they would 
otherwise be too intimidated or traumatized to testify freely 
(or at all).21 Those discrete challenges are now dwarfed by a 
much larger one: the need to find safe ways to conduct trials 
and hearings during a pandemic. Courts have flocked to the 
alternative of videoconferencing, but virtual proceedings 
create distance, disturb or erase sight lines, and in numerous 
ways wreak havoc with the usual common-law tools for 
evaluating demeanor. In this sense the pandemic has created 
a natural experiment through which we can examine which 
aspects of physical, synchronous presence are necessary to 
the evaluative process, and which may be optional or even 
unhelpful. Conversely, the resort to virtual courts prompts 
the question whether videoconferencing technologies offer 
any tools that might actually improve the process.22 
 
demeanor.”).  
 20. The Dutch system is often cited as one that most strongly favors 
documentary over oral, immediate evidence. See Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, 
and Consequences, supra note 12; see also supra note 3 and sources cited therein. 
 21. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 
(1988).  
 22. These efforts have already begun. See, e.g, Jenia Turner, Remote Criminal 
Justice, TEXAS TECH L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3699045. Turner surveyed a range of criminal law 
practictioners and judges on their experiences with virtual proceedings thus far. 
The results, as she summarizes:  
paint a complicated picture. They suggest that, on the whole, online 
proceedings can save time and resources for the participants in criminal 
cases and can provide broader access to the courts for the public. Yet 
respondents also noted the dangers of remote justice, particularly in 
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The pervasive recourse to demeanor evidence, which 
live, physically co-present hearings and trials makes 
possible, rests on the general belief that observation of the 
facial expressions, tones of voice, and postures of others 
permits us to divine their inner lives (for example, their 
mental and emotional states), and therefore their credibility 
and character. The underlying folk psychology rests on two 
beliefs. The first is that demeanor conveys readily discernible 
truths that words alone might not disclose. Facial expression 
and body language, unlike language, are regarded as 
spontaneous, natural, and non-manipulable.23 The second 
belief, less remarked upon in the standard legal literature, is 
that those truths tell observers something essential about 
the “deep character” or “condition[] of [the] very soul”24 of the 
person whose demeanor they’re observing. 
Turning first to the issue of discerning truth, the 
overwhelming weight of social science research debunks the 
common-sense belief that demeanor is a reliable cue to 
credibility. In general, people, including judges, are much 
less accurate than they think they are when they seek to use 
witnesses’ demeanor to differentiate truthful from 
untruthful testimony.25 But the larger problem is that 
 
contested or evidentiary hearings and trials. These include the inability 
of the parties to present evidence and confront witnesses effectively, and 
the challenges of providing effective legal assistance remotely. 
Respondents also expressed concern that the court’s perception of 
defendants may be negatively skewed by technology and that indigent 
defendants might be disproportionately harmed by the use of remote 
hearings. Defense attorneys were especially likely to be concerned about 
the use of the online format and to believe that it tends to harm their 
clients. Federal judges and prosecutors were also more likely than their 
state counterparts to be skeptical of the benefits of online criminal 
proceedings outside the context of the pandemic. 
Id. (manuscript at 1). 
 23. See RICHARD WEISMAN, SHOWING REMORSE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL 
OF EMOTION 84 (2014). 
 24. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Remorse, Apology, and Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
423, 437 (2007). 
 25. See, e.g., Jeremy Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The 
Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 
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although most jurists and scholars focus on “truthfulness” or 
“credibility” as if they are freestanding, measurable traits, 
the use of demeanor evidence in practice is much broader. 
Demeanor is used not merely to determine whether the 
witness is reliable or honest, but to assess character more 
broadly. That means demeanor matters in every case. Every 
judgment of liability, guilt, or punishment is in part a moral 
judgment about the deservingness of the parties, to which 
their character is always relevant, notwithstanding 
restrictions on character evidence that rules of evidence 
impose.26 And gauging witnesses’ credibility is often bound 
up with the question of whose story is most believable, which 
in turn may depend on the fact-finder’s conception of the 
character of the storyteller. Decision-makers may choose to 
believe a witness’s story because they think the story she 
tells is consistent with who they perceive her to be, and they 
assess her character in part by how she tells the story, which 
includes her demeanor while telling it.27 What is believable 
depends as well as on the assumptions and biases28 of the 
fact-finder who is evaluating the witness—whether a story 
seems believable will depend on whether it resonates with 
the fact-finder’s experience of the world.29 
 
1157 (1993); Robert Fisher, The Demeanour Fallacy, 2014 N.Z. L. REV. 575 (2014); 
Stephen Porter & Leanne ten Brinke, Dangerous Decisions: A Theoretical 
Framework for Understanding How Judges Assess Credibility in the Courtroom, 
14 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 114 (2009). 
 26. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404; see generally ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF 
THE TRIAL (1999); Susan A. Bandes, Remorse and Judging, in REMORSE IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Steven Tudor et al. eds., 
forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter, Bandes, Remorse and Judging].  
 27. See generally BURNS, supra note 26; NEAL FEIGENSON, EXPERIENCING 
OTHER MINDS IN THE COURTROOM (2016). 
 28. See, e.g., M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301 (2018); Ronald 
S. Everett & Barbara C. Nienstedt, Race, Remorse, and Sentence Reduction: Is 
Saying You’re Sorry Enough?, 16 JUST. Q. 99 (1999); Justin D. Levinson, 
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 
57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007). 
 29. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Video, Popular Culture, and Police Excessive 
Force: The Elusive Narrative of Over-Policing, in U. CHI. LEGAL F., LAW AND 
URBAN INSTITUTIONS TEN YEARS AFTER THE WIRE 1, 2 (2018) (recounting the trial 
1288 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
For example, rape complainants may be evaluated on 
whether their demeanor reflects what the fact-finder regards 
as the “appropriate” emotional reactions to a rape. For a fact-
finder who assumes the sole believable reaction to a rape is 
intense emotion or even hysteria, complainants whose 
behavior lacks strong affect will appear less credible.30 
Conversely, one study of judicial reactions to victim impact 
evidence showed that judges were less likely to believe rape 
allegations when the complainant’s tone was angry. These 
victims are “often perceived by judges as out of control and 
unable to gain perspective on the crime”; one judge observed 
that “excessive anger ‘can certainly backfire . . . . 
[S]ometimes victims don’t understand that their hatred of 
the defendant . . . undermines the credibility of what they are 
saying . . . .’”31 Judges tended to find that victims who 
expressed anger were dishonest or untrustworthy. They felt 
that anger and outrage in the courtroom were the province 
of the judge, not the complainant.32 As our culture becomes 
 
of Police Commander Glenn Evans for assaulting Rickey Williams). Judge Diane 
Cannon resolved the credibility dispute in favor of Evans, finding that Williams’ 
testimony of unprovoked assault “was improbable and contrary to human 
experience” but that Evans’ testimony of unprovoked assault by an unarmed 
civilian on an armed police officer was more plausible.  
 30. See Ken Armstrong & T. Christian Miller, An Unbelievable Story of Rape, 
THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2015/12/16/an-unbelievable-story-of-rape. In this account (later adapted as a 
television series called “Unbelievable”), not only was the complainant judged 
unbelievable based on her lack of affect when reporting the rape; she was charged 
with filing a false report. One consequence was that her rapist went on to rape at 
least five other women before he was finally arrested. See also Lawrence G. 
Calhoun et al., Victim Emotional Response: Effects on Social Reaction to Victims 
of Rape, 20 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (1981) (more emotional rape victim deemed 
more credible); Franz Willem Winkel & Leendert Koppelaar, Rape Victims’ Style 
of Self-Presentation and Secondary Victimization by the Environment: An 
Experiment, 6 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 29 (1991) (more emotional presentation led 
rape victim to be perceived as more credible and cautious and less responsible for 
the event). 
 31. MARY LAY SCHUSTER & AMY PROPEN, VICTIM ADVOCACY IN THE COURTROOM: 
PERSUASIVE PRACTICES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD PROTECTION CASES 67–
68 (2011). 
 32. Id. 
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more sophisticated about the psychology of sexual assault, 
judges and policymakers are (albeit all too gradually) coming 
to understand that these sorts of reactions to rape victims 
are based on unsupported folk knowledge and harmful 
stereotypes about what victims “ought” to feel. 
The potentially dire consequences of the belief that 
demeanor is a window into the soul can also be seen quite 
starkly in capital trials, in which jurors place enormous 
weight on their perceptions of the defendant’s visible 
remorse in determining whether to impose a death sentence. 
Most capital defendants do not testify, so the evaluation is 
often based entirely on their facial expressions and body 
language while they sit silently at the counsel table watching 
the evidence unfold. As Scott Sundby reports the findings of 
the Capital Jury Project: 
Jurors scrutinized the defendant throughout the course of the trial, 
and they were quick to recall details about demeanor, ranging from 
. . . attire to . . . facial expressions. . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [Mostly] jurors . . . deduce[d] remorselessness from the . . . 
defendant’s lack of emotion during the trial, even as the prosecution 
introduced . . . horrific . . . [evidence]. . . . . 
. . . [The defendant’s perceived] boredom [or indifference made 
jurors angry]. . . . [Some saw them] as cocky and arrogant[,] 
. . . indicat[ing] . . . [they] lacked . . . human compassion . . . .33 
Consider, for instance, the capital sentencing hearing of 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev,34 whose body language, including his 
beard-fiddling and his tendency to lean back in his chair, was 
perceived as arrogant and inappropriately informal. 
 
 33. Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of 
Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1551, 1562–
64 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
 34. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Given Death Penalty in 
Boston Marathon Bombing, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2015/05/16/us/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-death-sentence.html. But see 
United States v. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2020) (vacating death sentence 
for inadequate voir dire regarding prejudicial pretrial publicity). 
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Although there is no evidence that remorse can be accurately 
assessed via facial expressions, jurors tend to believe they 
are well equipped to make just such an evaluation in a 
matter of life or death.35 Nor are judges and the media 
exempt from these beliefs.36 Indeed, studies show that judges 
and other fact-finders employ cues to complex states like 
remorse in an inconsistent or even contradictory manner, so 
that one judge may rely on a given behavior as indicative of 
remorse while another believes the same behavior indicates 
lack of remorse.37 
To further complicate matters, legal decision-makers’ 
assessments of demeanor evidence and their use of it in 
reaching judgments about others’ credibility and character 
are subject to several cognitive-emotional biases. These 
include the fundamental attribution error (the tendency to 
ascribe the behavior of others to their inherent character, 
while ascribing one’s own behavior to situational factors);38 
naïve realism (people’s belief that they see the world as it is, 
underestimating or ignoring the effect of their own cultural, 
racial, and other biases on their perceptions and 
judgments);39 conversely, an egocentric bias according to 
which people place undue weight on their own conscious 
 
 35. See Susan A. Bandes, Remorse and Criminal Justice, 8 EMOTION REV. 14 
(2016). 
 36. See generally Bandes, Remorse and Judging, supra note 26.  
 37. See, e.g., Rocksheng Zhong, Judging Remorse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 133, 155–59, 159 n.209 (2015) (finding that some judges believed direct 
eye contact was a sign of remorse, while others believed that lack of eye contact 
and a demure gaze downward were signs of remorse). 
 38. See Hanan, supra note 28; see also Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary 
Personology, in HANDBOOK OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 130–31 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel 
T. Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, 
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 122–27 
(1980). 
 39. E.g., Thomas D. Gilovich & Dale W. Griffin, Judgment and Decision 
Making, in HANDBOOK OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 542, 565–74 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. 
Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010); Robert J. Robinson et. al., Actual 
Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naïve Realism” in Intergroup 
Perception and Conflict, 68 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404 (1995). 
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emotional responses in gauging others’ emotional states;40 
and a variety of other biases that complicate the ability to 
read the emotional states of others. 
Some of these habits of thought strike at the heart of the 
values of fairness, equality, and dignity. Reading demeanor 
across racial lines is particularly fraught. This is in part an 
artifact of selective empathy—the difficulty we all have 
attending to and interpreting cues from members of other 
cultural, racial, or ethnic groups.41 In other words, empathy 
is negatively affected by difference.42 The problem is greatly 
exacerbated when the subject is black, in part because of the 
pernicious, tenacious perception of a linkage among 
blackness, criminality, and dangerousness.43 This linkage 
also translates into perceptions that black defendants are 
less likely to be remorseful.44 In addition, offenders’ juvenile 
 
 40. See Kate Rossmanith, Affect and the Judicial Assessment of Offenders: 
Feeling and Judging Remorse, 21 BODY & SOC. 167, 171–72 (2015) (explaining 
how a judge may believe she knows the defendant is sincerely remorseful if the 
judge is moved or affected by the defendant’s performance). 
 41. See, e.g., Everett & Nienstedt, supra note 28, at 118.  
 42. Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and Consequences, supra note 12, at 178. 
 43. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived 
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital Sentencing Outcomes, 17 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383 (2006). More generally, there is substantial evidence that 
juries simply attach a greater value to the lives of white victims and their families 
than to black victims and their families. See Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. 
Salerno, Emotion, Proof, and Prejudice: The Cognitive Science of Gruesome 
Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1003, 1037–40 (2014); 
David R. Karp & Jerrett B. Warshaw, Their Day in Court: The Role of Murder 
Victims’ Families in Capital Juror Decision Making, in WOUNDS THAT DO NOT 
BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 275, 284 (James R. 
Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006). The extent to which this association varies 
based on the race of the evaluator (i.e. in situations where evaluator and subject 
are both black) is complex and likely context-dependent. 
 44. See William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 257–58 (2001) (finding that viewing the same black 
defendant, white decision makers saw arrogance and coldness, whereas black 
decision makers saw remorse). 
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status45 and mental or emotional disabilities46 can confound 
the evaluation of demeanor.47 
All of these problems in the perception, interpretation, 
and application of demeanor evidence raise serious concerns 
about whether demeanor evidence on the whole impairs the 
accuracy as well as the fairness of legal decision-making. 
Although our legal system is unlikely to jettison demeanor 
evidence entirely, perhaps judges and policymakers can be 
persuaded that it is not the gold standard for gauging 
credibility and character that it’s commonly thought to be. 
Once its mystical aura is pierced, and social science is 
brought into the equation, demeanor evidence turns out to 
need much improvement. This brings us to the question of 
whether virtual court proceedings will simply replicate these 
problems, exacerbate them, or possibly provide an 
opportunity for reform. 
Demeanor Evidence and Videoconferencing 
Relying on demeanor in online proceedings is likely to 
create additional difficulties because evaluating demeanor 
online is very different from evaluating it in the traditional 
courtroom. Pre-pandemic experience with partly virtual 
hearings—for example, parole or asylum hearings in which 
the applicant appears via videoconference—suggests that 
witnesses and litigants will be evaluated more negatively in 
virtual courts than in in-person hearings or trials. Several 
studies, for instance, support the view that it’s harder for 
decision-makers to empathize with those testifying on 
screen, at least in the immigration, bail, and parole 
 
 45. See Martha Grace Duncan, “So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless 
Children and the Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (2002). 
 46. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the 
Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 595 n.115 (2008). 
 47. See generally Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and Consequences, supra note 
12, at 185–87. 
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contexts.48 
 
 48. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Efficiency and Cost: The Impact 
of Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
869, 900–01 (2010); see Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 
NW. U. L. REV. 933 (2015). Criminal defendants who appear via video-link at 
arraignment, bail hearing, or sentencing offer a salient example. These 
defendants may speak from jail via poor internet connections to a judge who may 
be only a static-laden image on a small screen, and who may not even be looking 
at the screen image of the defendant. See, e.g., PENELOPE GIBBS, DEFENDANTS ON 
VIDEO–CONVEYOR BELT JUSTICE OR A REVOLUTION IN ACCESS? 8 (Transform Just. 
2017). Their sense of isolation and alienation from the courtroom may be 
exacerbated by the absence of their lawyers from their side, e.g., Edie Fortuna 
Cimino et al., Charm City Televised & Dehumanized: How CCTV Bail Reviews 
Violate Due Process, 44 U. BALT. L.F. 57, 77–87 (2014), as well as the meanness 
of their physical surroundings in the video room in the jailhouse and the sounds 
of the noises of jail. Carolyn McKay, Video Links from Prison: Court ‘Appearance’ 
within Carceral Space, 14 LAW, CULTURE, & HUMAN. 242, 252–54, 258, 260 (2018); 
see also CAMILLE GOURDET ET AL., COURT APPEARANCES IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
THROUGH TELEPRESENCE 8 (Priority Crim. Just. Needs Initiative 2020). Juvenile 
or mentally challenged defendants may find it especially difficult to understand 
what’s going on. E.g., Gerald G. Ashdown & Michael A. Menzel, The Convenience 
of the Guillotine: Video Proceedings in Federal Prosecutions, 80 DENVER U. L. REV. 
63, 81, 84 (2002); GIBBS, supra. While the image quality may be better in current 
iterations of videoconferencing software than it was in the remote appearances 
studied by the many researchers cited above, and while defendants may not be 
uniquely stigmatized in fully virtual courtrooms because all parties, rather than 
only the defendant, are appearing on the screen (although the defendants will 
still be the only ones on Zoom clothed in prison outfits and seen behind locked 
doors—quite stigmatizing), the comparison to the traditional courtroom makes 
plain the importance of one thing that’s missing on Zoom: the physical co-
presence of defendant and judge. We discuss this further below. 
 This body of research raises fascinating questions about whether the effect of 
video technology itself on decision-makers’ empathy may be confounded with 
other features of the mediated interaction, such as the unprepossessing or even 
downright stigmatizing views of remote defendants to which the camera typically 
provides access, and whether the outcome may be qualified by decision-makers’ 
pre-existing stores of empathy toward the witness or litigant. The research to 
date does not provide a clear answer to the latter question. Only one study has 
manipulated video vs. live appearance as an independent variable and measured 
empathy as a dependent variable; it found that mock jurors did not feel less 
empathy for a child witness who testified via CCTV vs. one testifying live. See 
Holly K. Orcutt et al., Detecting Deception in Children’s Testimony: Factfinders’ 
Abilities to Reach the Truth in Open Court and Closed-Circuit Trials, 25 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 339 (2001). On the other hand, several studies measuring responses 
that could be construed as loose proxies for empathy (e.g., likeability) have found 
that persons are regarded more favorably when encountered live vs. via a screen. 
E.g., Sara Landström et al., Witnesses Appearing Live Versus on Video: Effects on 
Observers’ Perception, Veracity Assessments and Memory, 19 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
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Perceptual and social psychological research offers many 
possible reasons for this effect. The most obvious is the 
reduction in eye contact. Virtual court guidelines recommend 
that participants look at the camera when speaking, but even 
people with extensive videoconferencing experience will 
often look at the screen display instead, because they want 
to see how their words are being received and because the 
images of others’ faces are more visually interesting than the 
green camera light on their laptop or other camera. When 
they look at the screen instead of the camera, they will not 
appear to be looking at the viewer. Viewers may then 
construe this apparent lack of eye contact, or the frequent 
shifting of the eyes away from direct contact and back again, 
as a sign that the speaker is being uncertain or even 
dishonest.49 And while witnesses will be looking at the 
interface to determine which participants are looking 
carefully at them as they speak, the small size of others’ 
images and the lack of mutual alignment of gaze may make 
this difficult to determine. As a result, witnesses may lose 
 
PSYCHOL. 913 (2005); DAVID TAIT ET AL., TOWARDS A DISTRIBUTED COURTROOM 
(2017). On the effects of the remote participants’ environment on their own and 
others’ perceptions of video-mediated adjudication, see, for example, EMMA 
ROWDEN ET AL., GATEWAYS TO JUSTICE: DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR 
REMOTE PARTICIPATION IN COURT PROCEEDINGS (2013). 
 49. E.g., Ernst Bekkering & J.P. Shim, Trust in Videoconferencing, 49 COMM. 
ACM 103 (2006); Gordon D. Hemsley & Anthony N. Doob, The Effect of Looking 
Behavior on Perceptions of a Communicator’s Credibility, 8 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 136 (1978); Molly Treadway Johnson & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, 
Videoconferencing in Criminal Proceedings: Legal and Empirical Issues and 
Directions for Research, 28 J.L. & POL’Y 211 (2006). Relatedly, from the 
perspective of perceivers, because the videoconferencing interface does not 
accurately recreate a common spatial environment which co-participants occupy, 
participants cannot reliably track each others’ gazes or understand the 
contextual meaning of their gestures, a problem which has been shown to 
decrease trust in intergroup videoconferenced communications. DAVID NGUYEN & 
JOHN CANNY, MULTIVIEW: IMPROVING TRUST IN GROUP VIDEO CONFERENCING 
THROUGH SPATIAL FAITHFULNESS, 1465 (SIGCHI Conf. Hum. Factors in 
Computing Sys. Proc. Apr. 28–May 3, 2007) [hereinafter NGUYEN & CANNY, 
MULTIVIEW]. Videoconferencing systems that correct for distortions or absence of 
gaze information, such as Nguyen and Canny’s Multiview system or the 
“distributed courtroom” system which David Tait and colleagues have tested, can 
reduce or avoid these negative effects. TAIT ET AL., supra note 48. 
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access to the sorts of feedback they would ordinarily receive 
in the physical courtroom.50 This ongoing sense of 
uncertainty about whether they are truly being paid 
attention to and understood may be reflected in witnesses’ 
demeanor while testifying, which decision-makers may then 
construe as a lack of confidence51 or lack of interactivity,52 
either of which may be misread to indicate diminished 
credibility. “Understanding the [nonverbal] language of eyes 
enables perceivers to attribute mental states to others,”53 
and it is easier for viewers to do this when the other person 
gazes directly at them. For instance, viewers have more 
difficulty rapidly identifying others’ emotional expressions 
when those others avert their gaze.54 In face-to-face 
interactions, “the level of emotionality in the encounter [can] 
be regulated by the amount of mutual gaze the participants 
permit[] each other,”55 but if there is little mutual gaze to 
begin with or, more to the point, if no one can be sure when 
mutual gaze is occurring, people will struggle to deploy their 
emotional intelligence to assess the situation. 
 
 50. But see Ian Ballon, How Working From Home May Change Federal Court 
Litigation for the Better, NAT’L L.J., (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.law.com/ 
nationallawjournal/2020/08/04/how-working-from-home-may-change-federal-
court-litigation-for-the-better/ (arguing that “Zoom and similar technologies . . . 
allow you to see how your own facial expressions appear to the judge—and adjust 
them accordingly”). Seasoned litigators may well be more able than anxious 
laypeople to take advantage of this function.  
 51. E.g., Neil Brewer & Anne Burke, Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies 
and Eyewitness Confidence on Mock-Juror Judgments, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
353 (2002); Elizabeth R. Tenney et al., Calibration Trumps Confidence as a Basis 
for Witness Credibility, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 46 (2007). 
 52. Judee K. Burgoon et al., The Role of Conversational Involvement in 
Deceptive Interpersonal Interactions, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 669, 
682 (1999). 
 53. C. Neil Macrae et al., Are You Looking at Me? Eye Gaze and Person 
Perception, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 460, 463 (2002). 
 54. See Markus Bindemann et al., How do eye gaze and facial expression 
interact?, 16 VISUAL COGNITION 708 (2008). 
 55. Adam Kendon, Some Functions of Gaze-Direction in Social Interactions, 
26 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 22, 58 (1967). 
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Witnesses in proceedings on Zoom are also likely to 
testify differently than they would in physical courtrooms for 
half a dozen other reasons, none of which bode well for 
judges’ and jurors’ construals of their demeanor. Witnesses 
who pause before answering a question due to connectivity 
issues not obvious to others could be construed as hesitant or 
uncertain, and hence less credible.56 Those who fidget 
excessively due to the unfamiliarity, discomfort, or boredom 
of sitting for hours in front of their computer screens may be 
perceived as less credible.57 Those who would gain 
reassurance on the stand from seeing supportive friends or 
family members in the physical courtroom will be deprived 
of that on Zoom and, as a consequence, may be less confident 
or forthcoming.58 Witnesses who see themselves in a window 
on the interface as they testify59 may be distracted, 
increasing their cognitive load,60 which in turn may 
 
 56. Bekkering & Shim, supra note 49. 
 57. Porter & Ten Brinke, supra note 25. 
 58. See Joe Miller, 7 Great Rules for Bringing Friends to Court, FAM. L. COACH 
(June 1, 2015), https://thefamilylawcoach.com/blog/7-great-rules-for-bringing-
friends-to-court/ (persons going to family court are often advised to bring a family 
member or friend to the courtroom to help them stay calm and focused); Amanda 
Konradi, Preparing to Testify: Rape Survivors Negotiating the Criminal Justice 
Process, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 404, 416–18 (discussing how some rape survivors 
enlist “team members” to attend trial to provide support during testimony); see 
also Levenson, supra note 46, at 593–94 (describing how presence in the 
courtroom of his brother and co-defendant Erik Menendez drew out Lyle 
Menendez’s emotional apology on stand). However, having friends or family in 
court may not always benefit the witness. See Miller, supra (the presence of 
friends may stoke anger); Jennifer A. Scarduzio & Sarah J. Tracy, Sensegiving 
and Sensebreaking via Emotion Cycles and Emotional Buffering: How Collective 
Communication Creates Order in the Courtroom, 29 MGMT. COMM. Q. 331, 343 
(2015) (inappropriate behavior); see also Amanda Konradi, Pulling Strings 
Doesn’t Work in Court: Moving Beyond Puppetry in the Relationship Between 
Prosecutors and Rape Survivors, 10 J. SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 5, 17 (2001) 
(some rape survivors feel grief when observing from the witness stand the pain 
of family members listening to them describe the assault). 
 59. As they will unless the court disables the self-view function. 
 60. See Ryan G. Horn & Tara S. Behrend, Video Killed the Interview Star: 
Does Picture-in-Picture Affect Interview Performance?, 3 PERSONNEL ASSESSMENT 
& DECISIONS 51 (2017). 
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adversely affect their mood and be reflected in their 
demeanor. Seeing themselves may also make anxious 
witnesses feel even more anxious and further impair their 
performance.61 Finally, as has often been noted, the casual, 
familiar environment of the home or office from which 
remote witnesses will testify, as well as their physical 
distance from the authority of the court, may lead them, 
especially those unaccustomed to participating in formal 
legal proceedings, to dress or behave in ways that would be 
inappropriate in the physical courtroom62 (even though they 
have taken the oath and been reminded by the judge that 
they are “in court,” and may have been prepared by the 
lawyer calling them to testify); as a consequence, the judge 
or jurors may evaluate their attitude and character more 
negatively. 
To be sure, some litigants may behave on Zoom in ways 
that lead decision-makers to evaluate them more positively. 
Witnesses who might be intimidated by the formality of the 
courtroom or the physically co-present judge may testify 
more confidently and coherently from the comfort of their 
homes.63 This would presumably be reflected in their 
demeanors, which the judge or jurors could then read (or 
misread) as cues to truthfulness.64 
Nontestimonial demeanor is also likely to be different on 
Zoom. As with testifying witnesses, differences between 
private and courtroom environments may lead nontestifying 
parties and others to dress inappropriately or display 
 
 61. See Jürgen Wegge, Communication via Videoconference: Emotional and 
Cognitive Consequences of Affective Personality Dispositions, Seeing One’s Own 
Picture, and Disturbing Events, 21 HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 273 (2006). 
But cf. Ballon, supra note 50. 
 62. See GIBBS, supra note 48, at 49. 
 63. See Orcutt et al., supra note 48. 
 64. See Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-
Circuit Technology on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions, 22 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165 (1998). 
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inappropriate nonverbal behaviors.65 Participants’ facial 
expressions and postures may also express the strain of 
attending to an extended videoconferencing session or their 
occasional frustration with glitches in the technology, either 
of which others may misconstrue as lack of respect for the 
proceedings—or perhaps as a disgruntled or hostile response 
to another participant’s words. 
 Not only will witnesses and parties behave differently in 
virtual courtrooms in ways that will be reflected in their 
demeanors; those who are watching and listening will 
perceive and interpret what they see and hear differently 
than they would in a physical courtroom. Consider first how 
the visual and audio information available through the Zoom 
interface differs from what can be seen and heard in an 
unmediated, physically co-present encounter. In one respect, 
videoconferencing may offer better access to demeanor 
evidence: the close-up image of a testifying witness in 
speaker view may actually occupy more of the observers’ 
visual field (and perhaps be better lit) than the view they 
would have in a physical courtroom, allowing them to 
observe the witness’s facial expressions more closely than 
they would at courtroom viewing distance and angles. As one 
judge reported after conducting a summary jury trial in a 
civil matter, the attorneys conducting voir dire were 
surprised that the online view provided even more 
information about juror demeanor that they would have had 
in court. “Online . . . ‘you see the whole face, eyebrow 
twitches, and panel members are way more relaxed’ sitting 
at home, instead of in a courtroom.”66 
 
 65. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyers are dressing way too casual 
during Zoom court hearings, judge says, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 15, 2020, 9:24 AM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers-are-dressing-way-too-casual-
during-zoom-hearings-judge-says (judge admonishes attorneys for, among other 
behaviors, appearing for Zoom court while in bed, still under the covers). 
 66. Marimow & Jouvenal, supra note 7 (quoting Judge Emily Miskel). 
However, as the authors note, the Zoom proceeding sometimes adds a sound that 
rarely intrudes on in-person trials: the flush of a toilet. 
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In several other respects, though, Zoom affords much 
less visual information about others’ demeanors. Most 
images on the interface are small; even speaking witnesses 
will appear in small frames if the proceedings are shown in 
gallery view.67 All other things being equal, smaller images 
tend to create less emotional impact,68 so whatever demeanor 
observers think they discern is likely to have less effect on 
their judgments. The size of the frame in which each person 
appears on Zoom, the fact that they will usually be seated for 
the duration, and their distance from their own cameras 
ordinarily means that viewers will see only witnesses’ and 
parties’ heads and upper bodies. In contrast to the views 
afforded in physical court, judges and jurors will not have 
much if any sense of witnesses’ and parties’ posture or bodily 
movements other than shifting in their seats, depriving them 
of cues that people use to read others’ demeanor in their 
 
 67. And these images are small not only in relation to the interface but to the 
viewer’s visual field as a whole; most participants will see everything within the 
frame of what is likely a 17” or smaller computer screen, rather than a larger 
courtroom screen or in person. 
 68. Maurizio Codispoti & Andrea de Cesarei, Arousal and Attention: Picture 
Size and Emotional Reactions, 44 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 680 (2007); Byron Reeves 
et al., The Effects of Screen Size and Message Content on Attention and Arousal, 
1 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 49 (1999). On the other hand, the small rectangle within which 
each Zoom participant is framed tends to call attention to that person’s 
demeanor, to the extent anyone is observing it, in a way that would not be true 
in the un-demarcated spatial surround of the physical courtroom. Inside the 
frame within the interface, the view of each participant becomes something like 
a close-up (or medium close-up) shot in a movie, with the implicit message, “Pay 
attention to the emotions this face is showing!” As Noël Carroll and William 
Seeley put it: “Indexing [in filmmaking] involves pointing the camera at 
something, thereby communicating, ‘Look here!’ Indexing occurs naturally when 
the camera is brought closer to its subject by means of a cut, zoom, or camera 
movement.” Noël Carroll & William Seeley, Cognitivism, Psychology, and 
Neuroscience: Movies as Attentional Engines, PSYCHOCINEMATICS: EXPLORING 
COGNITION AT THE MOVIES 49, 62 (Arthur P. Shimamura ed., 2013); see also 
Wendy P. Heath & Bruce D. Grannemann, How Video Image Size Interacts with 
Evidence Strength, Defendant Emotion, and the Defendant–Victim Relationship 
to Alter Perceptions of the Defendant, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 496 (2014) (finding 
complex interactions among the size of the screen on which a testifying defendant 
appeared, the level of emotion the defendant displayed, the nature of the case, 
and the strength of the evidence against the defendant). 
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everyday lives69 and that have, for better or worse, been 
considered important in physical trials (see for example the 
emphasis in the Tsarnaev sentencing hearing on what one 
journalist called “his toe-tapping, his beard-fiddling, the way 
he leans back in his chair with this collar open like he’s a 
Hollywood studio exec at a pitch meeting”70) and that judges 
find important in assessing offenders’ remorse.71 Nor, 
because each participant to the proceeding logs on and 
becomes visible only when already seated in front of his or 
her computer, will observers be able to see parties or 
witnesses walking to and from their positions in the 
courtroom (or see them in the hallways outside of the 
physical courtroom)—species of “offstage” behavior to which 
fact-finders often attach significance.72 Some participants, 
notwithstanding published guidance to the contrary, will 
appear in suboptimal lighting, which will make their facial 
expressions harder to see, or in cluttered environments, 
which will complicate the effort to identify the emotional 
 
 69. E.g., Beatrice de Gelder, Towards the Neurobiology of Emotional Body 
Language, 7 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 242 (2006); Dacher Keltner & 
Jennifer S. Lerner, Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 317, 321–23 (Susan 
T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010). 
 70. Seth Stevenson, The Implacable Bomber, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2015, 9:45 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/03/tsarnaev-trial-dzhokhar-appears-
unmoved-by-a-day-of-grisly-testimony.html. 
 71. Rossmanith, supra note 40, at 170–71. On the relationship between the 
view that the video camera affords of the other person’s body and empathy for 
the other person, one study comparing head-only to upper-body views of the other 
person and both with face-to-face communication found that head-only views 
resulted in less empathy for the other by some but not all measures. DAVID T. 
NGUYEN & JOHN CANNY, MORE THAN FACE-TO-FACE: EMPATHY EFFECTS OF VIDEO 
FRAMING, 423 (SIGCHI Conf. Hum. Factors in Computing Sys. Proc. Apr. 6, 
2009). The view of other participants available on Zoom varies depending on their 
camera angle, how far they sit from the camera, and so on, see infra text 
accompanying notes 78–82, but generally ranges somewhere between these 
researchers’ head-only and upper-body viewing conditions. 
 72. Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Offstage Behavior: Real Jurors’ 
Scrutiny of Non-Testimonial Conduct, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 311 (2009); Mary R. 
Rose et al., Goffman on the Jury: Real Jurors’ Attention to the “Offstage” of Trials, 
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 310 (2010).  
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valence of their expressions.73 Videoconferencing may also 
provide less audio information than in-person courtroom 
speech does, impairing decision-makers’ ability to discern 
the emotions conveyed by the sound of the voice.74 
The increased cognitive demands of participating in an 
extended Zoom proceeding75 and possibly the lesser drama in 
a videoconferenced as opposed to a physically co-present trial 
(we’ll return to this point in Part II) may reduce judges’ and 
jurors’ ability to pay attention to whatever they take to be 
demeanor evidence.76 Their ability to concentrate on a given 
witness or party may be further impaired by the 
simultaneous appearance on the interface of other 
participants (including themselves), offering a constant 
source of distraction, in an array that may shift, sometimes 
without notice, as persons are dropped or added. This 
increased mental effort that judges and jurors must allocate 
to what they are doing in the virtual courtroom may itself 
 
 73. See James E. Cutting & Kacie L. Armstrong, Facial Expression, Size, and 
Clutter: Inferences from Movie Structure to Emotion Judgments and Back, 78 
ATTENTION, PERCEPTION, & PSYCHOPHYSICS 891 (2016). 
 74. Elizabeth C. Wiggins, What We Know and What We Need to Know about 
the Effects of Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 731, 738 (2004) 
(“[W]hen voice is transmitted through phone lines as with videoconferencing, a 
middle bandwidth filter is used. This means that low and high frequencies of the 
voice are cut off. Thus, the content of the voice message is heard and understood, 
but some information about the emotional state of the speaker, which is carried 
in the higher frequencies, may be partly excluded. It is precisely this information 
that may be critical to judgments of the defendant’s remorse and credibility.”). 
 75. E.g., Kate Murphy, Why Zoom is Terrible, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/sunday-review/zoom-video-conference. 
html. 
 76. Indeed, given the small size of the frames in which everyone appears in 
gallery view, noted earlier, and the fact that the user’s audio all comes from a 
single source (the computer’s speakers or the headphones) and thus does not 
provide the locational cues that natural audio usually does, not to mention the 
absence of the understood “spatial arrangement of persons and artifacts” in the 
physical courtroom, Christian Licoppe & Laurence Dumoulin, The “Curious Case” 
of an Unspoken Opening Speech Act: A Video-Ethnography of the Use of Video 
Communication in Courtroom Activities, 43 RES. ON LANGUAGE & SOC. 
INTERACTION 211, 219 (2010), it may sometimes be hard, at least for a moment, 
just to tell who’s speaking. 
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bias their impressions of witnesses’ and parties’ demeanors. 
If they find it hard to watch and listen to a witness due to 
poor audio quality (which may be due to the speaker’s 
microphone, the user’s computer speakers or earphones, or 
either’s internet connection), the lack of synchronicity 
between video and audio, or simply the strain of attending 
closely throughout extended proceedings, they may be 
inclined to misattribute their negative feelings arising from 
those processing difficulties to the witness himself and to 
evaluate him less favorably.77 
Even more troubling, the factors that affect judges’ and 
jurors’ construals of witnesses’ and parties’ demeanors will 
also vary from one witness or party to another, biasing their 
relative assessments. To start with a salient example, the 
apparent sizes of participants’ faces may vary enormously 
depending largely on how far they sit from their cameras. 
While movie directors know that showing faces in close-ups 
as opposed to longer shots allows audiences to identify the 
faces’ emotional valence more easily,78 faces that appear too 
close may seem to be occupying observers’ personal space,79 
which observers may regard as inappropriate and annoying 
or even threatening.80 Conversely, witnesses whose faces 
appear much smaller than others may be granted less 
importance. Varying camera angles may also bias judges’ 
and jurors’ evaluations of witnesses and parties. Standard 
filmmaking texts teach that high angle shots tend to make 
the person depicted appear smaller or weaker, while low 
angle shots make the person seem more significant and 
powerful,81 and experimental studies have found that faces 
 
 77. This effect is called cognitive fluency. See Eryn Newman et al., Cognitive 
Fluency in the Courtroom, in THE ROUTLEDGE INT’L HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND 
INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. 102 (Ray Bull & Iris Blandón-Gitlin eds., 2020). 
 78. Cutting & Armstrong, supra note 73. 
 79. See EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (Anchor Books ed., 1969). 
 80. See John Storck & Lee Sproull, Through a Glass Darkly: What Do People 
Learn in Videoconferences?, 22 HUM. COMM. RES. 197, 200 (1995). 
 81. ROY THOMPSON & CHRISTOPHER J. BOWEN, GRAMMAR OF THE SHOT 41–43 
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seen from below are perceived more positively than faces 
seen from above.82 Finally, context matters: “[W]hen a 
person looks at a human face with the goal of perceiving 
emotion, the perceiver encodes the face in context,”83 so the 
various backgrounds that appear behind different witnesses 
and parties may affect judges’ and jurors’ interpretations of 
their demeanors differently. 
Crucially, judges and jurors may remain unaware of how 
these features of the videoconferencing medium are 
influencing their evaluations and decisions. Instead, they 
will intuitively think that they are perceiving others’ facial 
expressions, tones of voice, and postures “as they really are.” 
This is naïve realism.84 And they will discount or ignore the 
extent to which the demeanors that witnesses and parties 
are displaying are due to the situation in which those 
witnesses and parties find themselves—not just in court but 
in court on Zoom, talking to their computer screens and 
aware of other participants only as multiple head-and-upper-
torso images in the interface. This is the fundamental 
attribution error.85 Both biases will likely be exacerbated in 
virtual proceedings precisely because of the interposition of 
the medium between observer and observed.86 
 
(2d ed., 2009). 
 82. Arvid Kappas et al., Angle of Regard: The Effect of Vertical Viewing Angle 
on the Perception of Facial Expressions, 18 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 263 (1994); cf. 
Bekkering & Shim, supra note 49, at 106–07 (finding that subjects recorded from 
above or from the side are trusted less compared with those looking straight into 
the camera). 
 83. Lisa Feldman Barrett & Elizabeth A. Kensinger, Context is Routinely 
Encoded During Emotion Perception, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 595, 598 (2010). 
 84. NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY 9–10 (2009). 
 85. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 86. Whether judges’ and jurors’ awareness of the effects of the medium on 
their interpretations of demeanor evidence and their use of it in their judgments 
will be informed at all by their own increased familiarity with Zoom is an open 
question. Knowing in a general way how the camera angle and other features of 
videoconferencing distort appearances is one thing; being mindful of specific 
biasing effects while paying attention to the hearing or trial and knowing how to 
adjust one’s thinking to account for those biases is another thing entirely. See, 
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The perception and evaluation of others’ demeanor will 
also be different in virtual court because the phenomenology 
of virtual environments differs from that of direct, face-to-
face experience. Most importantly, the feeling of co-presence, 
the sense of being together with others in the world, is very 
different. Co-presence does not simply disappear when 
physical co-location does; indeed, some have argued that 
online interactions, including online legal proceedings, are 
capable of producing a psychologically rich sense of co-
presence, defined as “the synchronization of mutual 
attention, emotion, and behavior.”87 However, Zoom makes 
it very hard to achieve the kind of co-presence that exists in 
a physical courtroom.88 In principle, each participant in the 
videoconferenced proceeding can see and hear everyone else 
in real time, an essential condition for synchronization and 
hence co-presence. That synchronous access, however, can be 
impaired or disrupted: People may be dropped from the 
session without warning due to connectivity issues, and the 
audio may be glitchy or lag, upsetting the precise 
coordination of facial expression and voice that is critical to 
how we attend to each other’s emotional displays in everyday 
life. Moreover, the difficulty (impossibility, really) of 
 
e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental 
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 117 (1994) (discussing debiasing). 
 87. Celeste Campos-Castillo & Steven Hitlin, Copresence: Revisiting a 
Building Block for Social Interaction Theories, 31 SOC. THEORY 168, 171 (2013). 
Sociologist Meredith Rossner, Rossner, Remote Rituals in a Virtual Court (2020) 
(unpublished paper) (on file with authors), has applied this notion of co-presence 
to the distributed courtroom. See supra note 6. For a review of various concepts 
of social presence in networked environments, see Frank Biocca et al., Toward a 
More Robust Theory and Measure of Social Presence: Review and Suggested 
Criteria, 12 PRESENCE 456 (2003). 
 88. A majority of respondents to Jenia Turner’s survey, see supra note 22 at 
56, expressed concern about the negative impact of virtual proceedings on 
credibility determinations, with defense attorneys expressing the greatest degree 
of concern. One defense attorney evocatively observed that “fact finders must be 
able to see a witness’ reaction to questioning in the flesh, where they can observe 
body language. And witnesses should not feel the safety of video distancing 
during questioning. They need to feel confronted, and the eyes of scrutiny upon 
them.” 
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establishing genuine eye contact (if a speaker appears to be 
looking at you, that almost certainly means he or she isn’t) 
disrupts the ongoing reciprocation of gaze, which is usually 
important for feeling engaged with the other person.89 
This points to one important reason why the diminished 
sense of co-presence matters to legal judgment: it can impair 
judges’ and jurors’ ability to empathize with a witness or 
party. While empathy may arise in various ways, its 
paradigmatic source is through physically co-present 
personal interaction, “an immediately felt correspondence 
between the kinesthetically perceived intentional 
movements of [one’s own body] . . . and the outwardly 
perceived movements and positions of an external body 
. . . .”90 “[Trial] courts provide the primary, or perhaps the 
sole, opportunity for personal interaction between . . . 
litigants and the judges who will decide their cases. 
Empathetic engagement in this context plays an essential 
role: it both informs the judge and reassures the litigant.”91 
But this sort of interaction simply can’t be experienced on 
Zoom. The judge’s and jurors’ own bodies, of which each is 
kinesthetically aware, remain in their respective homes or 
 
 89. Norm Friesen, Telepresence and Tele-absence: A Phenomenology of the 
(In)visible Alien Online, 8 PHENOMENOLOGY & PRAC. 17, 23–25 (2014); see also 
supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. Computer scientist Jaron Lanier said 
all of this clearly some time ago:  
Human interaction has both verbal and nonverbal elements, and 
videoconferencing seems precisely configured to confound the nonverbal 
ones. It is impossible to make eye contact properly, for instance, in 
today’s videoconferencing systems, because the camera and the display 
screen cannot be in the same spot. This usually leads to a deadened and 
formal affect in interactions, eye contact being a nearly ubiquitous 
subconscious method of affirming trust.  
Jaron Lanier, Virtually There, 284 SCI. AM. 66, 68 (2001). Despite improvements 
in videoconferencing technology in the last twenty years, the observation still 
holds true. 
 90. Iso Kern, Intersubjectivity, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY 355, 357 
(Lester Embree et al. eds., 1997) (discussing Edmund Husserl). 
 91. Susan A. Bandes, Empathy and Article III: Judge Weinstein, Cases and 
Controversies, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 317, 325 (2015) [hereinafter Bandes, Empathy 
and Article III]. 
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offices; the parties’ heads and shoulders appear in little boxes 
on computer screens. We have already noted the 
dehumanization or depersonalization of the remote 
defendant who appears for bail or sentencing via 
videoconferencing,92 but the absence of physical co-presence 
could undermine decision-makers’ ability to empathize with 
any other participant,93 and even when everyone appears 
remotely, via the same interface.  
Concerns and Next Steps 
If our legal culture continues to privilege physical 
courtrooms for the demeanor evidence they afford, and views 
virtual courts with suspicion until they can yield equivalent 
displays, it ought to be on a firmer basis than a mystical faith 
in the “elusive and incommunicable imponderable” nature of 
demeanor evidence.94 As mentioned above, the 
overwhelming weight of social science research debunks the 
common-sense belief that demeanor is a reliable cue to 
credibility. No comparable body of research establishes that 
demeanor is a flawed guide to others’ character, largely 
because the ground truth of the matter is harder to pin down, 
but even in the unlikely event courts could assess “deep 
character,” there is a real question whether they ought to be 
in the business of doing so, and of assigning consequences 
based on these assessments.95 
Making demeanor evidence available and enabling 
decision-makers to take it into account might still be deemed 
worthwhile because it is believed to serve the core 
adjudication values of dignity and fairness: as a basic feature 
of their personhood, litigants deserve to be seen and heard 
 
 92. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Emma Rowden, Distributed Courts and Legitimacy: What Do We Lose 
When We Lose the Courthouse?, 14 LAW, CULTURE, & HUMAN. 263, 271–74 (2018). 
 94. Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and Consequences, supra note 12, at 172.  
 95. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 437. 
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by those who will pass judgment on them,96 and they deserve 
to have their judge or jurors see, hear, and evaluate in real 
time the witnesses who provide the evidence on which they 
will be judged.97 If demeanor evidence is therefore still 
valued but its flaws are underscored and even exacerbated 
on Zoom, then perhaps the experience of virtual courts 
should hasten the implementation of reforms so that 
demeanor will be used more judiciously. At least one federal 
judge, for instance, employs revised jury instructions that 
make explicit some popular misconceptions about what 
certain demeanors signify.98 These could be adapted for use 
in virtual courtrooms, calling attention to specific ways that 
the videoconferencing interface may distort perceptions and 
interpretations of demeanor. In experimental research, 
cautionary instructions have been found to limit the impact 
of the camera perspective bias, the otherwise robust effect of 
the angle from which a suspect’s videotaped confession is 
shot on viewer’s judgments of whether the confession was 
voluntary and whether the suspect is guilty.99 Similar 
 
 96. See Bandes, Empathy and Article III, supra note 91. 
 97. This seems to be the thinking behind the position taken by federal courts 
that under Fed. R. Crim. P. 43, a criminal defendant must be physically present 
in the courtroom during his sentencing even if he consents to appear virtually. 
These courts have reasoned in part that: 
“[b]eing physically present in the same room with another has certain 
intangible and difficult to articulate effects that are wholly absent when 
communicating by video conference.” . . . .  
. . . A “face-to-face meeting between the defendant and the judge 
permits the judge to experience ‘those impressions gleaned through . . . 
any personal confrontation in which one attempts to assess the 
credibility or to evaluate the true moral fiber of another.’”  
United States v. Bethea, 888 F.3d 864, 867 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citations 
omitted). Even though the CARES Act allows federal judges to proceed with 
virtual sentencing under certain conditions, they have generally declined to do so 
for other than time-served sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Fagan, No. 2:19-
cr-123-DBH, 2020 WL 2850225 (D. Me. June 6, 2020). 
 98. Bennett, supra note 13, at 63. 
 99. See Jennifer K. Elek et al., Knowing When the Camera Lies: Judicial 
Instructions Mitigate the Camera Perspective Bias, 17 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL 
PSYCHOL. 123, 124, 129–31 (2012). 
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instructions, assuming they are adequately supported by 
additional, ecologically valid research, could speak to the 
biases introduced or exacerbated when witnesses and parties 
speak into their laptop or tablet cameras. Some courts have 
already begun adopting the practice of providing common 
virtual backgrounds for all participants100 to eliminate both 
visual distractions and disparities among witnesses and 
parties,101 which (as we’ve seen) can also affect assessments 
of demeanor. 
The inadequacies of access to demeanor evidence and the 
biases likely to result from resorting to it in virtual 
proceedings could, on the other hand, lead us to question 
whether the game is worth the candle. As already pointed 
out, judgmental accuracy is not served if decision-makers 
routinely gauge witnesses’ credibility on the basis of 
misleading and biased cues. In addition, fairness and dignity 
for parties are poorly served if judges and jurors 
systematically misconstrue parties’ demeanors based on 
stereotyped assumptions and prejudices.102 Conversely, 
some drawbacks of demeanor evidence in traditional 
courtrooms are highlighted by what virtual courts leave out. 
Witnesses may testify less confidently without the physical 
presence of family or friends in the public gallery, but (as 
discussed in Part III below) the absence of a visible public 
from the Zoom hearing or trial also means that witnesses in 
an excessive force case won’t be intimidated by the blue wall 
of officers staring them down.103 In a homicide case in a 
virtual courtroom, jurors won’t be susceptible to prejudice 
from the presence of the victim’s family members wearing 
 
 100. See Griffin v. Albanese Enterprise, Inc., No. 16-2019-CA-1555 (Fla. Cir. 
Ct., August 10, 2020) for an example of a court adopting this practice. 
 101. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 22 at 59 (reporting that defense attorneys 
surveyed expressed significant concerns about their cleints’ difficulties with 
access to technology). 
 102. See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.  
 103. See “sea of blue” discussion, infra note 203 and accompanying text.  
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buttons featuring the victim’s picture.104 And whether in 
physical or virtual court, judges and jurors who lack 
demeanor evidence will still be able to hear the parties’ 
stories, which can generate the empathy that is so important 
to litigants’ sense of dignity and decision-makers’ own well-
informed judgments.105 
We have argued for a more intentional approach to 
examining how live testimony in open courts advances 
cherished values like fairness, accuracy, and transparency, 
in order to determine how those values can be best retained 
when open trials are under threat or impossible. It is 
important to note a caveat. These values have always been 
weighed against countervailing interests such as privacy, 
security, and efficiency. Just as some may be tempted to try 
to unthinkingly recreate traditional arrangements, there is 
a converse temptation, already evident, to prize efficiency too 
highly. For example, four months into the current pandemic, 
the chief justice of the Texas Supreme Court and co-chair of 
the National Center for State Courts’ pandemic rapid 
response team stated, “we’re going to be doing court business 
remotely forever. This has changed the world.” Virtual court 
proceedings have been lauded as making “depositions, oral 
arguments, and jury selection much more efficient.”106 
Efficiency matters, but it can easily subsume other values at 
the heart of the justice system. 
If virtual proceedings lead to the conclusion that reliance 
on demeanor evidence should be minimized, a different, more 
radical set of reforms would be in order. For instance, it has 
been argued that even in physical courtrooms, witnesses 
should testify behind screens, visible only in silhouette, to 
 
 104. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). 
 105. See, e.g., FEIGENSON, supra note 27, at 121–24; Bandes, Remorse, 
Demeanor, and Consequences, supra note 12.  
 106. Allie Reed & Madison Alder, Zoom Courts Will Stick Around as Virus 
Forces Seismic Change, BLOOMBERG LAW, (July 30, 2020, 4:50 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/zoom-courts-will-stick-around-as-
virus-forces-seismic-change. 
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reduce the effect of jurors’ racial biases on their assessment 
of witnesses’ credibility.107 Extending this idea to virtual 
courts, videoconferencing interfaces could include filters to 
obscure witnesses’ facial expressions and upper-body 
postures. It seems more problematic to extend this to parties; 
after all, if trying cases on Zoom reduces judges’ and jurors’ 
capacity for empathizing with parties, it would seem that 
taking away most of whatever diminished sense of co-
presence is felt would even more strongly undermine the 
multiple core values of adjudication that empathy serves: 
inclusivity, dignity, fairness, and accuracy.108 
There is much to be learned about how virtual 
proceedings affect the presentation and interpretation of 
demeanor evidence. Perhaps more to the point, there is still 
a vast amount to be learned about the presentation and 
interpretation of demeanor evidence in traditional 
courtrooms. For a central, largely unquestioned tenet of the 
common-law system, and one that exercises enormous 
influence over decisions about property, liberty, and even 
life, demeanor evidence has been resting on its laurels for far 
too long.  
  
 
 107. Chet K.W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil of Ignorance, 
41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 373 (2005); see also Stanley P. Williams Jr., Double-Blind 
Justice: A Scientific Solution to Criminal Bias in the Courtroom, 6 IND. J.L. & 
SOC. EQUALITY 48 (2018) (recommending that to avoid racial bias, defendant not 
be visible to jurors). 
 108. The absence of physical co-presence in virtual courts also prevents 
arguably inappropriate demonstrations of empathy, such as Texas Judge Tammy 
Kemp’s return to the courtroom after the murder conviction of white ex-police 
office Amber Guyger, who was found guilty for fatally shooting an innocent black 
man, Botham Jean, in his own apartment, to hug Guyger (and give her a Bible). 
Sarah Mervosh & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Amber Guyger’s Judge Gave Her a 
Bible and a Hug. Did That Cross a Line?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/us/amber-guyger-judge-tammy-kemp-
hug.html. For that matter, it prevents inappropriate expressions of anger as well, 
such as the courtroom assault on Larry Nassar by the father of one of his victims. 
See infra note 257 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE COURTROOM AS A SITE OF JUSTICE 
Since at least the time of Homer, authoritative justice 
has been performed at a “proclaimed place” known to the 
entire community.109 This may have been outside, like the 
stones on which the judges depicted on Achilles’ shield in the 
Iliad sat110 or the trees under which South African 
community tribunals were traditionally convened,111 or 
inside, often in buildings also used for other governmental 
business.112 The location need not be fixed: Assize hearings 
were held peripatetically in England for eight centuries, 
ending only 50 years ago;113 the Australian Federal Court set 
up shop in the remote Great Victoria Desert to give its 
imprimatur to an Aboriginal land claims settlement.114 The 
contemporary expectation in Anglo-American legal culture, 
however, shaped by the dominant practice since the late 18th 
and especially the 19th century, is that trials take place in 
courtrooms designed for adjudication, located within a public 
building, a courthouse, primarily dedicated to that same 
purpose.115 
What basic values are served by insisting that 
adjudication be conducted in courtrooms inside courthouses? 
In principle, it serves every value we’ve identified. Holding 
hearings and trials at a publicly known and accessible venue 
promotes inclusiveness. The nobility and often grandeur of 
 
 109. Richard Mohr, In Between: Power and Procedure Where the Court Meets 
the Public Sphere, in A THOUSAND EYES: MEDIA TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND 
AESTHETICS 99 (Marit Paasche & Judy Radul, eds., 2011) (quoting District Court 
Act 1973 (NSW) No 9 div 4 18F (Austl.)). 
 110. Raymond Westbrook, The Trial Scene in the Iliad, 94 HARV. STUD. 
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 53 (1992). 
 111. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 351. 
 112. See LINDA MULCAHY, LEGAL ARCHITECTURE 24–27 (2011). 
 113. Although at each location the judges’ arrival and attendance at the local 
site of justice were accompanied by great ceremony. LINDA MULCAHY & EMMA 
ROWDEN, THE DEMOCRATIC COURTHOUSE 49–50 (2020). 
 114. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 366–72. 
 115. MULCAHY, supra note 112, at 31. 
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the courthouse and the courtrooms within it reaffirm the 
authority of the state and the centrality of adjudication to 
good government while simultaneously recognizing every 
litigant and witness as worthy of equal dignity and 
respect.116 A courtroom designed to provide clear sight lines 
among all the participants and to make each one’s speech 
clearly audible throughout the room enhances the fairness of 
the proceedings and the accuracy of the resulting judgment. 
And, to the extent that testimony, other evidence, and 
argument are also plainly visible and audible to members of 
the public and press, the courtroom promotes transparency. 
In practice, of course, courtrooms in courthouses may fail 
to achieve some or all of these goals. Much adjudicatory 
business is done in unprepossessing rooms that convey little 
sense of dignity or state authority.117 Antiquated facilities 
and overcrowding can make showing up for court an 
oppressive experience. The interiors of courthouse buildings 
are often designed to ensure the efficiency and privacy of 
judges’ and lawyers’ offstage work but at the cost of baffling 
and disorienting lay participants and their families.118 Poor 
acoustics in the courtroom or street noises intruding from 
outside can distract participants, making it harder for 
parties, lawyers, judges, and jurors to attend to the 
testimony and argument on which the decision will be 
based.119 In England and Australia, although not the United 
States, courtrooms are configured as if to stigmatize criminal 
defendants by placing them in a dock, isolated from the other 
participants. The perceived need for greater security in 
recent years has worsened the problem: docks are now 
enclosed behind Plexiglas shields, impairing defendants’ 
ability to see and hear, and to be seen and heard, including 
 
 116. See Rowden, supra note 93, at 265–66.  
 117. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 317. 
 118. See MULCAHY, supra note 112, at 88–97. 
 119. MULCAHY & ROWDEN, supra note 113, at 15. 
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by their own counsel.120 
Consider some benefits of moving proceedings online. 
Permitting laypeople to conduct legal business via 
videoconference from their own homes makes participation 
in the justice system less burdensome and more inclusive.121 
Civil and family court litigants don’t have to travel to the 
courthouse, navigate their way to the proper room, and wait 
perhaps several hours for their cases to be called, at the cost 
of forgoing work and arranging for child care (if doing either 
is even possible for them);122 they can simply log on to the 
court’s video platform from their smartphone or tablet and 
follow the instructions.123 Inclusiveness and dignity may also 
be enhanced during the virtual proceeding to the extent that 
litigants and witnesses, especially vulnerable ones, feel less 
intimidated appearing and testifying from their own homes 
than when forced to enter formidable buildings, filled with 
officials enforcing opaque and byzantine rules, and then 
speak in the physical presence of an imposing judge sitting 
on high.124  
Online adjudication—part of a broader trend, predating 
 
 120. See id. at 284–98. 
 121. See Jane Donoghue, The Rise of Digital Justice: Courtroom Technology, 
Public Participation and Access to Justice, 80 MOD. L. REV. 995 (2017). 
 122. For one affecting example of the burdens of going to court, see DAVID 
FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE: ONE LAWYER’S JOURNEY INTO THE INFERNO OF AMERICAN 
JUSTICE at 127–135 (2006) (account of a young man arrested for walking a friend’s 
dog without carrying vaccination papers, leading to days in jail and the loss of his 
job as he unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a trial to establish his innocence); 
see also Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER, Oct. 6, 2014 (“A boy 
was accused of taking a backpack. The courts took the next three years of his 
life.”). 
 123. E.g., Press Release, Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Serv., New Video 
Tech to Increase Remote Hearings in Civil and Family Courts (July 1, 2020), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-video-tech-to-increase-remote-
hearings-in-civil-and-family-courts. 
 124. See Linda Mulcahy, The Unbearable Lightness of Being? Shifts Towards 
the Virtual Trial, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 464 (2008); Rowden, supra note 93; Meredith 
Rossner & Martha McCurdy, Implementing Video Hearings (Party-to-State): A 
Process Evaluation, U.K. MINISTRY JUST. (2018).  
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the coronavirus pandemic, toward digitizing justice 
systems125—can also be more efficient than requiring 
hearings and trials to be conducted entirely in physical 
courtrooms. Lawyers can get their work done instead of 
spending hours driving to and from distant county 
courthouses.126 Evidentiary hearings and trials need not be 
delayed because remotely located witnesses, attorneys, 
interpreters, or other key participants cannot get to court on 
schedule.127 Judges in criminal courts are able to process 
more arraignments and bail hearings when the defendants 
need not be transported from jail and shuttled into and out 
of the courtrooms.128 Moreover, the security concerns 
involved in transporting those defendants and placing them 
in a physical courtroom are obviated when the prisoners do 
not need to leave jail to appear.129 
That something so utterly different in look, sound, and 
feel as a meeting on Zoom is now widely accepted as 
adjudication, though, directs our attention to an ineffable 
quality of courtrooms that these enumerations of pros and 
cons don’t quite explain. In Part III we will explore the 
complex roles of the public in (and outside of) the courtroom. 
Here we focus on two aspects of the hallowed tradition of 
adjudicating in a special kind of place. First, those who 
participate in proceedings in dedicated, culturally resonant 
 
 125. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, ONLINE COURTS AND THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE 
(2019). 
 126. Reed & Alder, supra note 106. 
 127. Gourdet et al., supra note 48, at 11.  
 128. Robin Davis et al., Research on Videoconferencing at Post-Arraignment 
Release Hearings: Phase I Final Report, ICF INT’L 4, 28 (2015); Anne Bowen 
Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The Remote 
Defendant, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2004). 
 129. Gourdet et al., supra note 48, at 4. Of course, the technology must be 
working properly and all participants properly prepared to use it in order to 
realize the benefits of virtual adjudication. Often this is not the case, whether 
because of deficiencies in infrastructure, preparation for the hearing, or 
monitoring during the proceedings. See, e.g., id. at 13–16; Linda Mulcahy et al., 
Exploring the Case for Virtual Jury Trials During the COVID-19 Crisis, U.K. 
MINISTRY JUST. (2020); Rossner & McCurdy, supra note 124. 
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courtrooms may find those proceedings more authentic and 
legitimate than those conducted virtually because they are 
more likely to feel engaged in something personally 
significant. Second, the configuration of the courtroom as a 
stage shapes and structures the emotional interactions of 
trial participants and thus informs the judgments of 
decision-makers. For each aspect, we explore what is lost and 
what is gained in the move from physical courtrooms to 
virtual ones, and why it matters.  
The Courtroom as a Place 
 Several features of the traditional courtroom tend to 
make the experience of going to court feel out of the ordinary, 
even momentous. As we’ve noted, courtrooms in courthouses 
are discrete physical places dedicated to a particular kind of 
activity. For most litigants and witnesses, going to court 
takes them outside their daily routines and into a separate 
environment that, by its distinctive location (as well as its 
symbolism, to be discussed in a moment), signals that they 
will be engaged in a special, culturally acknowledged kind of 
activity requiring appropriate behaviors.130 The courtroom, 
along with the courthouse of which it is a part, also endures 
in time. The physical reality of the building and the 
courtroom binds each litigant’s experience not only to the 
experiences of their contemporaries but to the community’s 
ongoing legal tradition.131 The performance of a structured, 
socially significant activity in a special, enduring place of its 
own, removed from quotidian space and time, is the essence 
of communal ritual. Courthouses and courtrooms imagined 
as “temples of justice” carry precisely this connotation.132 
 
 130. Rowden, supra note 93, at 274. 
 131. See id. at 275–77. 
 132. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 137. Conducting adjudication in these 
dedicated, quasi-sacred sites is as central to the maintenance of the community’s 
nomos as the narratives the community tells about itself in its foundational legal 
documents. See generally Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
4 (1983). This continuity of the place of justice through time is perhaps especially 
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In addition, the architecture of the traditional 
courthouse and the symbolism of its interior design, 
decorations, and statuary reinforce participants’ sense that 
they have entered a special place to engage in a special sort 
of activity. “Architecture marks off and signifies that 
authority-to-judge which can only be found inside a court of 
law and nowhere else; it assigns legal discourse to a proper 
place.”133 Courthouses and courtrooms throughout Western 
history have employed a variety of iconography to convey 
each society’s vision of how justice should be performed and 
what goals it should strive to achieve; in modern 
democracies, these goals have tended to converge on 
“independent decisionmakers, requirements of public 
processes, a new ideal of fairness, and equal access for and 
equal treatment of all,”134 represented by a female figure of 
Justice (sometimes blindfolded, sometimes not) holding 
scales and a sword.135 Governmental flags and seals, as well 
as the generally imposing structure of the building and often 
the major courtrooms themselves, also signal the authority 
of the state. The architecture and symbolism of the 
courtroom and courthouse encourage those who enter to 
perform their roles in the hearing or trial with an attitude of 
formality, respect, and seriousness.136 
Things are different on Zoom. There is no imposing 
building or formal room; lay participants sit in the same 
rooms in their homes or offices in which they conduct many 
of their daily routines.137 There is no sense of entering 
 
important in common-law countries whose judge-made doctrine depends on the 
principles of precedent and stare decisis. 
 133. Mohr, supra note 109, at 107 (quoting Piyel Haldar, In and Out of Court: 
On Topographies of Law and the Architecture of Court Buildings, 7 INT’L J. FOR 
SEMIOTICS L. 185 (1994)). 
 134. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 15. 
 135. See id. at 1–139. 
 136. Rowden, supra note 93, at 275–76. 
 137. Or they may appear from often unprepossessing video rooms in 
courthouses or other locations. MULCAHY, supra note 112, at 171–72; ROWDEN ET 
AL., supra note 48. 
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(crossing the threshold to) a special place. Indeed, the virtual 
courtroom is in no particular place at all, visible only as an 
interface on the computer screens of participants—the same 
sort of interface participants use for socializing with friends 
and family or meeting with colleagues, which itself is on the 
same laptop or tablet they use for checking their e-mails and 
the news, shopping, and watching videos. Nor does the 
virtual courtroom extend in time. Traditional courthouses 
and courtrooms were there before the participants arrived 
and will be there after they leave; the buildings may be 
decades or centuries old and are built of materials made to 
last well into the future. Courtrooms and courthouses, like 
people and communities, have histories. Videoconferencing 
sessions do not. The virtual court is entirely ephemeral, 
called into being for each hearing and disappearing at its end 
with a tap on a keypad. As one legal videographer puts it: 
“Unless you hit ‘record,’ Zoom is vapor.”138 
Participation in proceedings in a traditional courtroom, 
in contrast to videoconferencing, makes people, especially lay 
participants who are not repeat players, feel that they have 
engaged in something eventful. This effect is due in part to 
the difference between direct and mediated experience. 
Direct experiences, which afford presence and, if social, co-
presence, are generally richer than mediated or vicarious 
ones. People who have had a particular experience can 
remember and imagine it viscerally in ways that those 
lacking that experience cannot.139 This stronger hold on 
consciousness means that, all things being equal, 
participation in a hearing or trial in a physical courtroom will 
feel more significant. Just as important, the distinctiveness 
of the site of adjudication, its continuity in time, and the 
symbolism of the building and the room elevate the personal 
significance of the events that take place there by connecting 
 
 138. Interview with Cathie Reese, President, Geomatrix Prod. (July 15, 2020). 
 139. David Lewis, What Experience Teaches, in THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
579, 579 (Ned Block et al. eds., 1997). 
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each participant to a location, a time span, and a society that 
are larger than the individual.140 
In contrast, remote participation, lacking bodily co-
presence and engagement, can feel “depersonalized” and 
“less humane.”141 Tiana Clark, a woman who recently got 
divorced on Zoom, wrote that what should have been a 
momentous experience seemed not fully real: 
My virtual divorce felt dreamlike — weeks later, I sometimes 
wonder whether it really happened. So much of dreaming feels like 
you’re trying to grab the hem of something that dissipates right in 
front of you. Videoconferencing has the same effect, inducing an 
exhausting sense of placelessness. . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [Despite the procedure’s legal efficacy], I still felt like I missed 
something.142 
Virtual court participants’ sense of presence can never 
be grounded in a unique place; it is always divided between 
being “in” the interface and observing it, as spectator or 
audience, from their homes or offices. This sense of dual 
presence has been extensively theorized in writings on film 
and media studies.143 The gist for our purposes is that the 
participant who is simultaneously an observer cannot feel as 
engaged in a videoconferenced proceeding as she would when 
her consciousness is not thus divided.144 
 
 140. See generally Rowden, supra note 93. Because “individuals and traditions, 
psyches and cultures, make each other up,” RICHARD SHWEDER, THINKING 
THROUGH CULTURES 2 (1991), enlarging the social and cultural context in which 
a person acts and interacts can enlarge the person’s sense of self as well. 
 141. Rowden, supra note 93, at 272–73. 
 142. Tiana Clark, The Surreal Anticlimax of Getting Divorced over 
Videoconference, WASH. POST (June 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
outlook/2020/06/23/surreal-anticlimax-getting-divorced-over-videoconference/. 
 143. E.g., ANNE FRIEDBERG, THE VIRTUAL WINDOW (2006). 
 144. Furthermore, the point of view that each participant has of the interface, 
seeing all other participants (focally or somewhat peripherally) at once without 
moving her head, is a view that she cannot possibly have in the physical 
courtroom. Cf. Judy Radul, Video Chamber, in A THOUSAND EYES: MEDIA 
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This sense of inconsequentiality can also be traced to the 
eliding of “the distinction between inside and outside, the 
very distinction that is most essential to the [adjudicatory] 
performance.”145 The litigant in virtual court is not 
physically, kinesthetically inside a special place; she remains 
in her home or office, while the proceedings take place 
nowhere in particular (from one perspective, they are 
distributed among the various physical locations in which all 
of the respective participants sit; from another, they take 
place in the cloud). Virtual proceedings feel less momentous 
because participants do not go to, enter, and then return 
from the community’s distinctive space dedicated to 
adjudication.146 
Why should this matter? Ms. Clark got her divorce; other 
litigants will have their contracts enforced or not, offenders 
will be sentenced, witnesses will say their piece, and courts 
will work through their dockets. What of any real importance 
is missing? The substantiality of the courtroom in the 
courthouse, the formality that the configuration of the room 
encourages, and the state authority that the building’s and 
room’s symbolism convey all tend to make participants in 
proceedings feel that they have had the opportunity to be 
heard. They feel this not just in a technical legal sense but in 
a way that is vivid, dignified, and resonant. They are more 
 
TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND AESTHETICS, supra note 109, at 117, 122–25. As a 
consequence, her visual awareness of the proceedings is disembodied, further 
removing it from her everyday phenomenal consciousness and thus making it 
seem “dreamlike,” “placeless,” and less real. 
 145. Cornelia Vismann, Tele-Tribunals: Anatomy of a Medium, in A THOUSAND 
EYES: MEDIA TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND AESTHETICS, supra note 109, at 81, 83. 
 146. See Mulcahy, supra note 124, at 480 (“It would seem, then, that live link 
[i.e., participation via video] has the potential to place key actors in the trial 
outside of the great temples to law that have become synonymous with state-
sanctioned adjudication in our cityscapes, and replace them with the mundane 
. . . . Live-link witnesses remain unaffected by the influence of court architecture 
or ornament. The ritual of a journey to the court and away from it are denied 
them. The court enters their space at the will of a technician and just as easily 
vacates it. Law comes, it goes, but it is constantly elsewhere.” (emphasis added)).  
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likely to feel that they have had their “justice moment.”147 
Crime victims, for instance (as we will discuss in Part III), 
often place great weight on being heard “officially.” This 
sense of officiality comes from participating in a hearing not 
only in front of a judge as representative of the judicial 
system, but also in a physical space whose heft and 
permanence reflect the weight and authority of the law. The 
opportunity to be heard matters to people’s sense of 
procedural justice,148 and hence their belief that they have 
been treated fairly. This implication of adjudication in a 
physical courtroom serves the core value of fairness as well 
as dignity.149 It remains to be seen whether a witness 
appearing only as a talking head on Zoom, in a virtual 
courtroom that disappears when the hearing ends, 
experiences the same sense of being heard and recognized. 
We suspect, however, that this sense of seriousness and 
shared purpose may be shortchanged as judges, court 
administrators, and some lawyers emphasize the efficiency 
of virtual proceedings.150 
 
 147. Hazel Genn, Professor, Univ. Coll. London, Online Courts and the Future 
of Justice, Address at the Birkenhead Annual Lecture 12 (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/sites/laws/files/birkenhead_lecture_2017_professor_
dame_hazel_genn_final_version.pdf.  
 148. E.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and the 
Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 1, 4–5 (2011).  
 149. At the extreme, litigants who feel that appearing virtually does not afford 
them their “justice moment” may disengage from the process, failing to pursue 
their rights as vigorously as those who get to appear in person. See Eagly, supra 
note 48, at 1000.  
 150. See Reed & Alder, supra note 106; see also Broward County (FL) Circuit 
Court Judge, Jack Tuter, remarking on the large number of hearings already 
conducted on Zoom by late April 2020, while the news report containing his 
remarks shows as b-roll several of the problems (small image frames, shifting 
arrays, defendants appearing from stigmatizing remote environments) we’ve 
noted in this Article, the producers possibly being unaware that the juxtaposition 
of this footage with the judge’s words could be problematic in any way. WPLG, 
After Nearly 2,000 Virtual Hearings, Broward Courts ‘Pleased’ with Zoom 
Platform, YOUTUBE (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
S8VexjxOgVU. 
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To some extent, the sense of speaking and being heard at 
the site of justice may be replicated in virtual courts. For 
instance, online platforms can be designed to evoke some 
sense of the “journey to the courtroom”—the transition of 
going from one’s daily life to the court. Such design 
innovations may help prompt some awareness of state 
authority,151 which may deepen participants’ sense of the 
gravitas and hence the eventfulness of the proceedings. 
“[J]udges [will also have to] make more explicit efforts to 
compensate for the absence of the usual affordances and cues 
provided by the physical courtroom in order to assist the 
remote participant to effectively ‘enter’ and remain in the 
court space.”152 By explaining to litigants and witnesses who 
are not repeat players how the proceedings will unfold, what 
the role of each person on the screen is, and how everyone is 
expected to behave, judges can help impress upon 
participants the significance of the occasion. Technological 
advances are also likely to improve participants’ sense of 
presence and co-presence in virtual courts, offering an 
experience a little closer to that of the physical courtroom.153 
Moreover, it’s possible that as people become increasingly 
accustomed to videoconferencing in their everyday lives, they 
will be less likely to devalue virtual interactions relative to 
in-person, face-to-face ones, and thus less likely to feel that 
online proceedings are somehow “unreal.”154 
The current world-wide experiment with virtual 
proceedings also suggests how the experience of justice in 
 
 151. Rossner, supra note 87. 
 152. Emma Rowden & Anne Wallace, Remote Judging: The Impact of Video 
Links on the Image and the Role of the Judge, 14 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 504, 521 
(2018); see also Mulcahy et al., supra note 129. 
 153. TAIT ET AL., supra note 48. 
 154. See Clark, supra note 142. In response, some might contend that this sort 
of adaptation would reflect merely that in an increasingly online and networked 
society, people are resigning themselves to diminished interactions with others. 
SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY AND 
LESS FROM EACH OTHER (1st ed. 2011); see also JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A 
GADGET (paperback ed. 2011).  
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physical courtrooms might be enhanced. The ease of getting 
to the online courtroom (when the technology is working 
properly) underscores the need to (re)design courthouses so 
that lay participants can find their way around and feel as 
comfortable as possible while waiting for their cases to be 
called.155 Judges in physical courtrooms should not assume 
that litigants and witnesses will somehow absorb from the 
imposing surroundings an understanding of what’s expected 
of them; rather, lay participants should be provided with 
more of the explicit guidance that is being recommended for 
virtual courts.156 The obstacles to mutual visibility and 
audibility that frequently arise on Zoom should redirect 
attention to the fact that participants sometimes can’t see or 
hear each other clearly enough in physical courtrooms either, 
encouraging court administration, judges, and staff to do 
what they can (within their limited resources) to address 
these problems. Our nascent experience with virtual courts 
underscores how the “day in court” as a physical 
phenomenon is typically discussed with reverence, but often 
without necessary attention to the practical steps needed to 
promote the inclusivity, transparency, and other values that 
make participating in adjudication so legally and culturally 
resonant.  
The Courtroom as Theater Space 
The physical courtroom plays yet another powerful but 
often unarticulated role: It helps shape and channel the 
emotions the participants display. The configuration of the 
courtroom is important. “The specific place . . . which is 
 
 155. See, e.g., MULCAHY & ROWDEN, supra note 113, at 326–27. 
 156. We might take a cue from Swedish courts, in each of which the visitor 
encounters a welcome booth near the entrance, staffed by a friendly person who 
explains the configuration of the courthouse and the courtroom, provides multi-
lingual informational brochures, and offers to accompany the lay visitor to the 
courtroom to provide emotional support. See, e.g., Sveriges Domstolar (last 
modified Sept. 9, 2014) (Swed.), http://old.domstol.se/Funktioner/English/Legal-
proceedings/To-witnesses/. 
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allocated to each participant (prosecution, defense, witness, 
judge) promotes the coherence of that complex and very 
sophisticated unity which is the trial.”157 “In court, where you 
are is who you are.”158 Judges have long been ensconced on 
raised platforms, front and center, often in rather grand 
chairs, in front of or flanked by symbols of the state and the 
court, indicating their authority over the proceedings and 
facilitating their exercise of it.159 Increasingly since the 19th 
century, courtrooms have been further partitioned so that 
each participant (litigant, lawyer, witness, juror) is limited 
to a certain location and must speak, if at all, from that 
position,160 while leaving room, generally at the back, for 
members of the press and the public. That some participants 
can be seen entering to take their positions (the judge 
entering from behind the bench and sitting down, the 
witness walking to the stand), while attorneys, at least, have 
greater freedom of movement within the well of the 
courtroom and try to use it to their rhetorical advantage, 
highlights certain moments in the proceedings and draws 
attention to them.161 The blocking of the courtroom stage 
helps structure the often fragmented discourses of the 
evidentiary hearing or trial into a sequence of dialogic 
exchanges, or, at any rate, speech directed toward specific 
other people in the courtroom but with the awareness that 
there is an audience.162 Everyone understands at each 
 
 157. Mohr, supra note 109, at 108. 
 158. Radul, supra note 144, at 119. 
 159. Even in those newer courtrooms in which the layout is less hierarchical—
the bench may be at the same level as the tables at which counsel and litigants 
sit, or the furniture may be arranged in a circle—the judge’s position tends to be 
singled out. See, e.g., MULCAHY & ROWDEN, supra note 113, at 243. 
 160. E.g., MULCAHY, supra note 112, at 43–53. 
 161. FERGUSON, supra note 10, at 70–71. This is somewhat analogous to how 
camera movement and editing enable movies to function as “attentional engines,” 
concentrating the audience’s focus on important moments in the drama. Carroll 
& Seeley, supra note 68, at 62. 
 162. Thus, the lawyer conducting direct or cross-examination speaks to the 
witness, but so that the judge and jury can hear; the witness may respond to the 
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moment who is addressing whom, and all can know as they 
speak that other participants and members of the public are 
watching and listening, gauging their “interactional 
competence.”163 
All of the participants, moreover, are present in the 
space of the courtroom and therefore physically co-present 
with one another. The physical distance between different 
pairs or groups of participants varies; the witness may be 
seated far enough from the jurors that they can’t hear her 
clearly unless she remembers to speak into the microphone, 
whereas the jurors themselves are seated closely enough to 
each other that they may be able to sense from their 
neighbors’ postures, glimpsed in their peripheral vision, who 
is paying attention to the testimony and who is drifting off. 
But all participants are, and know that they are, in a shared 
physical space. When a prosecutor asks a witness if she sees 
the perpetrator in the courtroom and the witness points 
toward the defendant, everyone can follow her gesture (even 
though the prosecutor, to create a good record, will add, “Let 
the record show that the witness pointed at the defendant”). 
When a lawyer holds up an item of physical evidence or 
directs everyone’s attention to a photograph shown on a large 
courtroom screen, all heads and eyes tend to turn in the same 
direction. These and other instances of the “synchronization 
of mutual attention” feed the shared sense of co-presence.164 
Co-presence extends to the jury room: jurors who have 
observed the witnesses and the parties together over the 
course of the trial then deliberate in a common space, where 
their ability to interact face-to-face, orienting their bodies 
toward and away from each other and following each other’s 
 
lawyer or also, by turns, to the judge and/or jury; lawyers address the judge with 
objections; the judge responds to them with her rulings; the judge delivers her 
instructions to the jury, and so on. 
 163. Christian Licoppe, Video Communication and ‘Camera Actions’: The 
Production of Wide Video Shots in Courtrooms with Remote Defendants, 76 J. 
PRAGMATICS 117, 119, 132 (2015). 
 164. Campos-Castillo & Hitlin, supra note 87, at 171. 
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gestures, facilitates mutual feedback165 and can increase 
their mutual trust.166 
Once again, things are different on Zoom. Within the 
interface, the locations and sizes of the boxes in which each 
participant appears on “gallery view” may or may not evoke 
the hierarchy of roles in the physical courtroom, with the 
judge clearly in the command position (say, at the top and 
center of the array). But the array may be unstable, changing 
whenever a participant is added or dropped or, in speaker 
view, whenever someone else begins to speak.167 This 
undermines any impression of formal hierarchy, even though 
the participants are individually identifiable by the small 
labels Zoom places within each box, aided by introductions 
made by the conscientious judge. At the same time, the 
visibility of each participant’s home or office environment 
can exert a distracting centrifugal force, fragmenting the 
virtual courtroom into a mere juxtaposition of personal 
settings filled with window treatments, bookshelves, and 
tchotchkes.168 There is of course no bodily co-presence. 
Participants do not share an actual common space; the 
relationships between their images on the screen have no 
 
 165. ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES (1963). 
 166. See NGUYEN & CANNY, MULTIVIEW, supra note 49. 
 167. The convener may stabilize the array somewhat by “pinning” the video 
showing a given participant. But unless the convener of the Zoom meeting 
chooses the proper settings, each participant may also change his or her view of 
the interface at will, toggling between speaker and gallery view. And regardless 
of the control the convener exercises over the interface, each participant or other 
viewer may adjust the size of the interface on his or her laptop or other screen, 
changing the size and reconfiguring the arrangement of the boxes in which 
participants appear. 
 168. The injection of this sort of individual informality into the space of 
adjudication is not unprecedented. For instance, Resnik and Curtis discuss the 
informality of courtrooms in 17th century Netherlands and temporary justice sites 
in modern Western Australia, which have included onlookers, dogs, and so on. 
RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 367–72. The personal environments visible on 
Zoom strike us as anomalous in contrast to the more regimented formality of 
20th–21st century courts in the United States and England. The other examples, 
though, suggest that not all of the trappings of what we take to be the traditional 
courtroom are necessary to what we might deem to be proper adjudication. 
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connection to the relationships their bodies would have to 
one another in a real physical room. Among other things, this 
makes it impossible to determine from the positions of 
interlocutors’ bodies and the directions of their heads and 
eyes who is speaking to whom. And because there is no 
courtroom gallery, participants remain unaware of any 
audience beyond the array of heads and torsos on the 
interface. 
In contrast, the physical courtroom’s “large room with 
space for an audience, exaggerated demarcations and 
enlarged spatial distances between players prescribe a 
public persona.”169 More specifically, the configuration of the 
physical courtroom and the actual or at least implied 
presence of an audience tends to make participants more 
aware than they generally are in daily life that they are 
engaged in a performance.170 This heightens the sense of the 
gravity of their choice of words and expressions, and their 
interchanges with others. Law’s abiding faith in the power of 
words may incline people to think that verbal content alone, 
ultimately reduced to words on pages, is sufficient for 
adjudication. Yet it’s the interpersonal performance of 
expression and behavior which creates lived experience and 
“reafffirm[s] . . . the moral values of the community.”171 
The tropes of the courtroom as a stage and the trial as 
 
 169. Rowden, supra note 93, at 274 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 170. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
(paperback ed. 1959). 
 171. Id. at 35. “To the degree that a performance highlights the common official 
values of the society in which it occurs, we may look upon it, in the manner of 
Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown, as a ceremony – as an expressive rejuvenation 
and reaffirmation of the moral values of the community.” Id. Goffman is 
concerned to explain performance in everyday interactions, whereas formal legal 
proceedings, of course, are already structured by procedural rules and the 
deployment of government officials. Our contention is that conducting the 
proceedings in a courtroom enables participants to interact expressively, and 
thus reaffirm (or not) the community’s moral values, in ways they cannot when 
the “same” proceedings are conducted entirely online. 
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theater are well worn and sometimes criticized172 but 
nevertheless valid and pertinent here. “Drama and trial are 
allies. . . . [In each,] the politics of staging, visualizing, and 
demonstrating [take center stage]. [T]he right behavior is 
precisely the art of acting well in the eyes of the subjects 
watching the performance.”173 The display of demeanor and 
emotion in court are part of an essential theatrical re-
presentation of the events in dispute, imposing on each 
witness, litigant, and lawyer (and possibly judge) the 
demand to “act well” in the eyes of the audience. 
Certainly, as Robert Ferguson reminds us, the theatrical 
nature of trials in physical courtrooms can affect legal 
judgment by eliciting stereotypical emotional performances 
and potentially penalizing witnesses and parties who fail to 
“act well.” This is part of what he describes as the “aura” of 
the courtroom. The emotional environment created by 
courtrooms, however, makes them valuable as sites of justice 
for a reason that is not reducible to ritual or mystique. 
Courtrooms, as noted above, are configured to enable dialogic 
speech and expression among physically co-present 
participants, and these two features of the courtroom 
facilitate intelligible emotional interactions. The emotions 
people feel and express in social interactions are subject to 
constant modulation and recalibration based on the moment-
to-moment feedback provided by facial expression, tone of 
voice, and posture.174 That is, each person can more readily 
 
 172. E.g., FERGUSON, supra note 10. Peter Goodrich has examined at length the 
complex interplays among law, theater, and rhetoric throughout Western legal 
history. Peter Goodrich, Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 417, 418 (Thomas 
O. Sloane ed., 2001). 
 173. Cornelia Vismann, “Rejouer les crimes” Theater vs. Video, 13 CARDOZO 
STUD. L. & LITERATURE 119, 127–28 (2001). 
 174. “[E]motions in social settings emerge during moment-to-moment 
interactions” but “[e]motion construction at any one point in time is constrained 
by the ongoing or developing relationship in which it takes place” and “depends 
on the larger sociocultural context.” Michael Boiger & Batja Mesquita, A 
Sociodynamic Perspective on the Construction of Emotion, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS 377, 379–82 (Lisa Feldman Barrett & James A. 
Russell eds., 2015). 
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read the other and know that he or she is being read.175 Each 
significant dyad—defendant-judge, lawyer-witness, witness-
jury, juror-juror—features this kind of emotional interaction. 
Other participants, observing these interactions, can more 
readily interpret them as well. Judges, for instance, rely on 
these moment-to-moment affective cues when engaging, 
together with other participants, in the emotional 
management of their courtrooms.176 On a video conference, 
in contrast, where participants often seem to be addressing 
everyone (or no one in particular) and it’s difficult to follow 
where they are looking,177 emotional interactions can seem 
illegible and inscrutable. 
The physical courtroom thus yields a more transparent 
emotional environment than the virtual court does, inclining 
decision-makers in physical courtrooms to feel that they are 
judging rightly. By making emotions available in a way that 
the videoconferencing interface does not and by affording 
decision-makers themselves more opportunities to observe 
and engage in emotional interaction, proceedings in 
courtrooms can enhance decision-makers’ (and the public’s) 
sense that the proceedings are revealing more of the human 
truth of things, however misled they may be by their 
stereotypical expectations for how parties and witnesses 
should express themselves. And if decision-makers have the 
impression that they are taking more of the witnesses’ and 
parties’ psychological reality into account, whether that 
cashes out in assessments of credibility, character, or both, 
 
 175. GOFFMAN, supra note 165. In face-to-face, physically co-present 
interactions, “sight begins to take on an added and special role. Each individual 
can see that he is being experienced in some way, and he will guide at least some 
of his conduct according to the perceived identity and initial response of his 
audience.” Id. at 16. 
 176. See, e.g., Stina Bergman Blix & Åsa Wettergren, A Sociological 
Perspective on Emotions in the Judiciary, 8 EMOTION REV. 32 (2015); Terry 
Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1481; 
Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Magistrates’ Everyday Work and Emotional 
Labour, 32 J.L. SOC’Y 590 (2005). 
 177. See supra notes 49–55, 89 and accompanying text. 
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they may feel that their judgment process is more grounded 
and more complete, leading them in turn to feel that the 
process is going well.178 Jurors in particular “want to feel 
right about their decisions . . . striving to work their emotions 
and their judgments into a satisfying totality.”179 Believing 
that they have had access to witnesses’ and litigants’ 
relevant emotions and registering how they themselves have 
responded emotionally during the flow of the proceedings, 
they are more likely to regard their experience and their 
judgments as well-grounded and authentic. The co-presence 
of their fellow jurors in the courtroom and the jury room also 
helps them to negotiate the group’s emotional response,180 
which can reinforce their sense that they are judging rightly. 
This is not to say that the resulting verdicts are likely to 
be more factually accurate, assuming that one could access 
the ground truth apart from the legal process itself.181 
However, insofar as every legal outcome reflects a moral 
judgment about the parties in light of the values the 
community deems important,182 and emotions are not mere 
bodily signals about how things are going for the person 
experiencing them183 but also judgments of value, of what 
ought to matter,184 decision-makers who take more 
emotional information into account and feel right about their 
 
 178. See generally Gerald R. Clore & Jeffrey R. Huntsinger, How the Object of 
Affect Guides Its Impact, 1 EMOTION REV. 39 (2009).  
 179. NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME 106–07 (2000). 
 180. See, e.g., PAULA NIEDENTHAL ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION: 
INTERPERSONAL, EXPERIENTIAL, AND COGNITIVE APPROACHES 235–36 (2006). 
 181. See Neal Feigenson, Emotional Influences on Judgments of Legal Blame: 
How They Happen, Whether They Should, and What to Do About It, in EMOTION 
AND THE LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 63–64 (Richard Wiener & Brian 
Bornstein eds., 2010).  
 182. See BURNS, supra note 1. 
 183. See generally LISA FELDMAN BARRETT, HOW EMOTIONS ARE MADE (2017); 
ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR (1994). 
 184. See generally Martha Nussbaum, Emotions as Judgments of Value, 5 YALE 
J. OF CRITICISM 201 (1992). 
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decisions can judge better in this broader sense.185 
  
 
 185. In contrast, those who conceive of legal proceedings as basically a matter 
of task-oriented information exchange as opposed to interactive moral judgment 
may be right that videoconferencing (or audioconferencing, for that matter) is not 
inferior to face-to-face interactions. See Judee K. Burgoon et al., Testing the 
Interactivity Principle: Effects of Mediation, Propinquity, and Verbal and 
Nonverbal Modalities in Interpersonal Interaction, 52 J. OF COMM. 657 (2002). 
This is also not to say that judges or jurors will experience decision-making as 
easier in physical than in virtual courtrooms. If anything, the increased 
availability of affective information, other participants’ and their own, may make 
integrating those emotions with their cognitions more challenging. The claim is 
that to the extent that they are able to integrate all of this information, they are 
likely to feel satisfied that they are judging well. 
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III. PUBLIC TRIALS 
The iconic courtroom drama, for all its laser focus on the 
main stage action between attorneys and witnesses, often 
widens the lens to include another important character as 
well: the audience. The courtroom audience in legal dramas 
plays various roles. It may act as a Greek chorus reflecting 
and guiding our own emotional reactions to the legal 
confrontations, or as a counterpoint to the moral message— 
a depiction of small-town prejudice, for example. It may 
function as a sort of expanded jury, reacting to the evidence 
for the benefit of jurors and lawyers, as in Anatomy of a 
Murder.186 It may by its very presence signal the triumph of 
the rule of law, as Judgment at Nuremberg187 did. It may, 
collectively, play a more active role, attempting to encourage 
a verdict through a unified presence, whether supportive, 
outraged,188 or intimidating.189 It may, as the courtroom 
gallery in To Kill a Mockingbird190 memorably did, depict 
hierarchy in the way townsfolk are seated (with all black 
spectators in the balcony and white spectators on the same 
level as the core dramatic actors). It may, as Inherit the Wind 
ingeniously did, emphasize the importance of the audience 
by showing the deflated face of Williams Jennings Bryan 
when the judge politely offered him a chance to address the 
(empty) courtroom after the verdict had been rendered.191 
The camera may home in on individual reactions, for 
example Scout’s sorrow and shock at the verdict on behalf of 
 
 186. ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959). 
 187. JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (Amber Entertainment 1961). 
 188. The portrayal of the outraged clamor of the white citizenry as lynch mob 
quite explicitly illustrated the fragile boundary between the lawless mob and the 
trial, both in Tom’s narrow escape from lynching and in the way the trial that did 
take place simply placed the veneer of public justice on the foreordained killing 
of an innocent man. See TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Brentwood Production 1962). 
 189. See infra note 208 (reference to the “sea of blue”). 
 190. See Radul, supra note 158.  
 191. INHERIT THE WIND (United Artists 1960).  
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her father, her town, and her ideals.192 It may focus on the 
reactions of the families of the parties (as in A Lesson Before 
Dying,193 where the camera lingers on the devastated 
reaction of the defendant’s grandmother to the defense 
attorney’s reference to “putting a hog in an electric chair”194). 
It may showcase attorneys performing for one another195 or 
attending a trial to watch other attorneys perform.196 Or it 
may capture a non-verbal exchange between witnesses and 
spectators—a gesture of support197 or of intimidation.198 
Once the verdict comes down, it often captures the frenzy of 
reporters sprinting for the telegraph or phone to share the 
news with the wider public, sometimes even depicting phone 
lines, excited chatter, and rapidly multiplying newspapers to 
illustrate the viral spread of the news.199 
The array of roles ascribed to spectators is not just an 
artifact of popular culture; it reflects a similar profusion of 
roles in legal theory and practice. In these images so 
memorably captured in film and the popular imagination, 
the public trial achieves a number of goals. As Ferguson 
describes: 
Courtrooms . . . become the face of the law, the place where outside 
observation operates as a check on authority. Habeas corpus . . . 
 
 192. TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 188. 
 193. See, e.g., A LESSON BEFORE DYING (HBO 1999).  
 194. Id. 
 195. See, e.g., LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001). 
 196. See, e.g., Better Call Saul (AMC television broadcast) (scenes in which 
Kim Wexler observes criminal trials in order to decide whether to change from 
corporate law to indigent criminal defense). 
 197. MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Studio 1992) (showing the approving nod 
of a woman in the audience when a witness declares that no self-respecting 
Southerner cooks instant grits).  
 198. For example, in the first episode of The Wire, McNulty observes the trial 
of D’Angelo Barksdale, both out of interest and to assert his presence. Drug king-
pin Stringer Bell sits in the audience, watching the star witness against his 
nephew recant her testimony to permit D’Angelo to walk free. The Wire: The 
Target (HBO broadcast June 2, 2002).  
 199. See CHICAGO (Miramax 2002). 
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signifies the right of the accused person to appear in public before 
a judge, where judgment itself can be judged. When a trial proceeds 
inappropriately—when even a minority of observing citizens believe 
it to be unjust . . . the law and its officials face public criticism. 
Debate then extends beyond the courtroom, leading to controversy 
of a different order and magnitude.200 
Although Ferguson is writing here primarily about high 
profile trials, his points apply across the board. A public trial 
helps safeguard justice by promoting transparency. It 
provides an incentive for the principals to conduct 
themselves appropriately and fairly in the eyes of the 
immediate audience and the community that audience 
represents. It serves as a powerful reminder that the 
proceedings are not merely a private interchange, but a 
function performed on behalf of the community, in which 
community-wide problems are addressed and norms 
articulated. But there are a number of unresolved tensions 
inherent in the notion of a public trial. Whose right is the 
right to a public trial? What precisely is the function of 
spectators in securing this right, and to what extent does it 
depend on their proximity in time and space? How does the 
role of spectators differ from the wider goals of public 
education and norm elucidation, and how does a public trial 
achieve these goals? 
There is nothing inherently problematic about the fact 
that a trial performs many functions at once, assuming it is 
able to perform them properly. The current pandemic, 
however, forces courts and others to grapple with precisely 
what these functions are, and how to best replicate them 
when the public’s physical, contemporaneous presence may 
be out of the question. Even then, we might consider this a 
temporary problem, on the theory that eventually trials can 
simply return to their previous ways and their previous 
reliance on the ill-defined nature of the public trial 
guarantee. This would be a missed opportunity. 
 
 200. FERGUSON, supra note 10, at 1. 
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The Audience: Off the Radar 
The foundational texts that give rise to the public trial 
guarantees are familiar, but not nearly as straightforward as 
they may appear. The Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair trial 
is one of a series of trial rights accorded to the criminal 
defendant. It is commonly stated that this right “belongs to 
the defendant rather than the public.”201 Meanwhile, the 
right of the public and press to attend a trial, whether 
criminal or civil, is said to inhere in the First Amendment.202 
As Justice Brennan explained, “open trials are bulwarks of 
our free and democratic government.” Public access to court 
proceedings is an essential check and balance because 
“contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an 
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.”203 
This division of labor between the right of the defendant and 
the right of the public oversimplifies, or at least fails to 
capture adequately, the complex role of public trials where 
norms are articulated and enforced not merely for the parties 
present, but for the citizenry more generally.204 
 
 201. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POST-
INVESTIGATION 558 (2d ed. 2009).  
 202. See id.; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 599 
(1980) (Stewart, J., concurring). Although Richmond Newspapers concerned a 
criminal trial, it has been widely interpreted to guarantee a right to access in 
civil trials as well. 
 203. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice 
Burger, writing for the majority, also explained that making trials public 
“provid[es] an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion” in reaction 
to outrageous crimes, discouraging vigilantism and maintaining respect for the 
justice system, a pertinent observation with regard to our discussion of victim 
impact statements in sexual assault cases. See id. at 571. 
 204. See generally Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-
Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014) (demonstrating an important 
treatment of this topic and an argument for a more fully articulated recognition 
of the role of the audience); see also Justin D. Rattey, Whose Jury: Mediating 
Between the Competing Individual and Collective Jury Rights (May 28, 2020) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3612477 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612477 (arguing that there 
are at least two versions of the right to a jury: the individual right of the 
defendant and the collective public right to have criminal charges adjudicated). 
2020] VIRTUAL TRIALS 1335 
No public is present in courtrooms on Zoom. But there 
are a number of disconnects in the current discourse about 
public trials that make it difficult to assess what aspects of 
the public trial are essential to recreate or replace on Zoom. 
One is between the active and sometimes outsized role the 
audience plays in courtroom dynamics and the treatment 
this role receives in the legal literature. Legal scholars tend 
to treat “the trial” as synonymous with the main stage (or 
“front stage”205) action, and to ignore the presence and 
significance of the offstage action.206 Indeed, once the trial is 
memorialized in a transcript, the role of the spectators in the 
courtroom dynamics is rendered invisible. At that point the 
role of the public refers only to the larger public—the 
subsequent audience that is introduced to the action via the 
media. 
Robert Ferguson gives a rich description of the role of the 
courtroom audience, but one that casts it in the traditional 
role of passive observer, at least during the trial: 
We tend to forget that trials perform many different functions at 
once. . . . . 
[And] these . . . compete with each other and complicate 
perception. Caught within them, though without an explicit role to 
play, is the participant observer, symbol of the public in a public 
trial. . . . Participant observers exemplify and strengthen public 
decorum through the passivity of their presence, but their interest 
in a case carries them beyond what is being said and done in 
court.207 
Yet the role of the physical audience in a trial is not 
always that of passive observer. In a civil rights suit against 
a police officer or a criminal trial where a police officer is the 
defendant, for example, not uncommonly the audience 
 
 205. See, e.g., SARAH BETH KAUFMAN, AMERICAN ROULETTE: THE SOCIAL LOGIC 
OF DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING TRIALS 175 (2020). 
 206. Except in situations where that behavior is itself raised as an issue. See, 
e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). But see Rose & Diamond, supra note 
72, for an in-depth consideration of offstage behavior.  
 207. FERGUSON, supra note 10, at 19. 
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resembles a “sea of blue”—row upon row of uniformed police 
officers.208 The intent to provide support is clear, but the 
show of solidarity may, intentionally or unintentionally, 
evoke a host of other emotions in jurors, judges, litigants, and 
other members of the audience.209 Also not uncommon are 
displays of support among victims’ family members, perhaps 
wearing large pins with photos of the victim.210 The offstage 
action is decidedly part of the courtroom dynamic, and this 
is true even when the spectators do not intentionally 
organize shows of solidarity. Sarah Beth Kaufman recounts 
that when she observed the delivery of victim impact 
statements, the pain the family member described was “met 
with almost universal empathy from the people in the 
courtroom. . . . Audience members cried, passed tissues, held 
hands, and comforted one another.”211 
None of these dynamics are transcribed. Ignoring them 
doesn’t make them go away, but it does make it difficult to 
evaluate them and determine what role they play and ought 
to play. The specter of virtual trials makes this reckoning all 
the more crucial. In most virtual trial pilot programs, the 
virtual backstage consists of private areas, invisible to 
participants, and there is no spectator section at all, much 
less one engaged in a complex synchronous dynamic with the 
main stage action. If this is seen as unproblematic, it ought 
to signal the need for a larger reckoning about why we 
currently permit these powerful currents to affect the 
outcome of trials in physical courtrooms, and to do so entirely 
under the radar.212 
 
 208. KAUFMAN, supra note 205, at 181. 
 209. See id.  
 210. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 70.  
 211. KAUFMAN, supra note 205, at 173–74. 
 212. There has thus far been little attention to the loss of a backstage and 
audience in virtual proceedings. There may be several explanations for this 
inattention. First, the legal professionals (judges, lawyers, court administrators) 
whose views about the matter predominate may simply not be paying that much 
attention to what they have regarded as inessential. Second, people generally 
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The Courtroom: The Prosaic Reality 
Any discussion of what is gained and what is lost in a 
move toward virtual court proceedings must acknowledge an 
important disconnect between the imagined pre-COVID 
baseline and the actual baseline. Specifically, the iconic trial 
exists mainly in the breach. Pre-pandemic, trials were 
already extremely rare. Civil disputes are increasingly 
resolved in administrative settings, arbitrations, or other 
events that have little in common with public trials.213 The 
vast majority of criminal cases are decided by guilty pleas. 
Many other proceedings were being conducted virtually, 
without a public audience, before the pandemic: an 
increasing number of arraignments, bail hearings, and 
parole hearings, as well as many immigration and asylum 
cases, providing some early, troubling evidence that virtual 
hearings may be less protective of the rights of petitioners.214 
Thus, any discussion of the values advanced by public trials 
should also consider which of these values are lost in the 
broad range of cases where the public is already largely or 
entirely absent, and whether these values can be better 
safeguarded even in non-pandemic conditions. 
In addition, many actual trials bear little resemblance to 
the iconic trials of popular imagination. Consider this 
excerpt from the description of Courtroom 302 in the Cook 
County Criminal Courthouse, in Steve Bogira’s book of the 
 
adapt pretty quickly to new environments, and as they become more accustomed 
to interacting virtually, they may just come to accept as normal what’s actually 
a diminished sort of human interaction. See, e.g., TURKLE, supra note 154. That 
is, the loss will come to seem unproblematic because people are no longer aware 
of what’s been lost. Third, the sorts of proceedings that have actually been 
conducted online thus far, with isolated exceptions, have not been criminal trials 
or jury trials, much less the high-profile cases Ferguson writes about. Rather, 
they have mostly been the sorts of proceedings for which there wouldn’t have 
been much of an audience anyway, which might also help account for what seems 
to be the general inattention to the absence of the in-court audience. As trials 
begin to move online, this will be an interesting dynamic to watch. 
 213. See RESNIK, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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same name: 
A drab gray carpet covers the floor, and a chintzy fabric is peeling 
from the walls. . . . . 
The courtroom’s only windows are in the gallery . . . . On sunny 
mornings the reflection on the Plexiglas [which separates the 
spectator gallery from the rest of the courtroom] makes it hard to 
see into the courtroom from the gallery. The courtroom proceedings 
are transmitted to the spectators via ceiling speakers. [Sometimes 
the judge flips off the speakers for a private interchange and then 
forgets to turn them back on]. When he does, the spectators usually 
sit in meek silence at first . . . . Before one of them risks an act so 
bold as tapping on the Plexiglas . . . a courthouse regular [will 
usually] come to the rescue, approaching the glass doors with a 
hand cupped behind an ear, and [the judge] will lean forward and 
restore the audio.215 
Nicole Gonzalez van Cleve also wrote a searing portrait 
of the Cook County Criminal Courthouse, emphasizing the 
racial inequities exacerbated by and reflected in the 
architecture of the courtroom. She recounts: 
An elderly black woman sat silent and still in a courtroom. She 
hypnotically gazed at the courtroom proceedings through 
bulletproof glass as white professionals . . . casually navigated the 
daily exchanges that defined the court call . . . . The microphone was 
off, so you couldn’t hear, but you could see the professionals laugh 
and smile as if they were in a casual workplace. The interaction was 
like watching a silent movie and the audience of mostly black and 
brown people who sat watching . . . were like obedient churchgoers 
at a solemn funeral.216 
In short, proximity and physical presence have long been 
scarce commodities in some courtrooms and in many types of 
proceedings. As the above accounts powerfully capture, 
courtrooms can be intimidating, hierarchical, exclusionary 
places in which even those with the most direct stake in the 
proceeding—waiting witnesses, family members, and the 
 
 215. STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 34–35 (2005); see also Eagly, supra note 48. 
 216. NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN 
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 22 (2016). 
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litigants themselves—feel disempowered and alienated.217 
The public courtroom’s loftier purposes, its role in checking 
abuse or in educating the community, may at times seem 
abstract and out of reach in the lower state and local courts. 
For example, Van Cleve describes Cook County Criminal 
Court’s treatment of court-watchers, particularly non-white 
court watchers, as far from welcoming.218 It does not need to 
be this way. Thus, the question is not merely how to provide 
a simulacrum of what we had pre-pandemic. A better 
approach is to focus on the values the public trial is meant to 
advance and how they can best be achieved. 
Participants and Audiences: Victim Impact Testimony 
As we’ve noted, trials perform many functions at once, 
and sometimes these functions are at odds. It’s useful to 
tease out these functions and what arrangements they 
require. Victim impact testimony provides a rich context for 
a version of this exercise. According to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the appropriate audience for these statements is the 
sentencing judge (in most criminal cases) or jury (in capital 
cases), who can use the information about the impact of the 
crime as a factor in sentencing.219 In the lower courts, victim 
impact statements are widely thought to serve additional 
purposes. Victims and survivors are told that delivering the 
statements will help them heal and provide a kind of 
catharsis.220 The statements are also viewed as a way to 
 
 217. See, e.g., Mulcahy, Unbearable Lightness of Being, supra note 124, at 480–
81. 
 218. VAN CLEVE, supra note 216, at 22–28. 
 219. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820 (1991).  
 220. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUST., VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS (2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-vns/victim-impact-statements (noting that 
delivering victim impact statements may help provide closure for victims: “What 
is the purpose of a Victim Impact Statement? It provides an opportunity to 
express in your own words what you, your family, and others close to you have 
experienced as a result of the crime. Many victims also find it helps provide some 
measure of closure to the ordeal the crime has caused.”). But see Susan A. Bandes, 
Victims, Closure, and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 
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confront defendants face to face with the harmful 
consequences of their actions, ideally eliciting remorse or 
empathy from the defendant (which, presumably, would 
show in the defendant’s facial expression).221 The statements 
may also play a public education function, alerting the 
community more broadly to the nature of the harm.222 
The dialogic dimension of victim impact statements, so 
critical to their cathartic and moral educational goals, is 
seldom clearly articulated, and needs to be parsed from the 
rather ambiguous literature on the purposes of the 
statements.223 For the formally recognized purpose of 
conveying “information”224 about the nature of the harm to 
the sentencer, the judge or jury needs a sight line to the 
victim or family member. A reciprocal sight line isn’t really 
necessary, since the information flows only from victim to 
fact-finder, although (as mentioned in Part I) the victim may 
benefit from being able to see how her words are being 
received. Affording synchronous interaction becomes more 
urgent when we move to the goals of healing and catharsis 
for the victim and moral education for the defendant.225 
 
(2009) [hereinafter Bandes, Victims, Closure]; Susan A. Bandes, Closure in the 
Criminal Courtroom: The Birth and Strange Career of an Emotion, in EDWARD 
ELGAR RES. HANDBOOK ON L. & EMOTION (forthcoming Susan A. Bandes et al. eds., 
2020) [hereinafter Bandes, Closure in Criminal Courtroom] (critiquing the 
concept of the courtroom as a site for “closure” for crime victims). 
 221. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse 
and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 90 (2004). 
 222. See the MADD victim workbook; Bandes, supra note 220, at 14. 
 223. See Susan Bandes, What Are Victim-Impact Statements For?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jul. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/ 
what-are-victim-impact-statements-for/492443/. 
 224. Note the use of the word “information” here, the general refusal of victim 
impact statement jurisprudence to deal with the emotional dimensions of the 
statements, and with how the information verbal statements impart differs from 
that imparted by a written statement read to the fact-finder. See Susan A. 
Bandes, Share Your Grief but Not Your Anger: Victims and the Expression of 
Emotion in Criminal Justice, in EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL, 
PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Joel Smith & Catherine Abell eds., 
2016).  
 225. We do not suggest that we consider these goals appropriate, and have 
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These require proximity, or at least clear sight lines between 
victim and defendant as well as between victim and judge, to 
allow the victim to feel seen, heard and, ideally, understood. 
In the sexual assault cases against U.S. Gymnastics and 
Michigan State doctor Larry Nassar, for instance, victim 
after victim expressed the importance of the opportunity to 
face Nassar and tell him directly of the harm he had done.226 
 One concern with this dialogic aspect is that it depends 
on behavior that can’t be regulated: the facial expression, 
body language, and posture of the defendant. For example, 
Chanel Miller recounted that after Brock Turner was 
convicted of raping her, she sought to deliver her victim 
impact statement to him directly, but he, as well as other 
important court participants, refused to face her: 
I looked straight at the judge, meeting his eyes repeatedly, 
reminding him I was not done. I pointed at the back of the defense 
attorney’s cotton-haired head. He never turned to face me. I bore 
into the side of Brock’s unmoving face, his stoic profile. I was rooted, 
pointing at him. I wanted everyone consumed by my voice, in my 
control.227 
In another case, a mother addressed her daughter’s 
murderer directly, telling him she had “no room in her heart 
for hating him. But the defendant would not look at her, nor 
at the photo she held of her daughter. He stared impassively 
ahead, his big sloping shoulders still as a rock.” She said 
later: “I wanted to make sure he knew I was there.” But she 
“could see nothing in his eyes.”228 Others make their peace 
with the lack of a reaction. Rebekah Gregory, who lost a leg 
in the Boston Marathon bombing, wrote an open letter to 
 
elsewhere been critical of these uses of VIS and, indeed, VIS in general. See, e.g., 
Bandes & Salerno, supra note 43, at 1036–40; Susan Bandes, Empathy, 
Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 410 (1996); 
Bandes, supra note 220, at 1; Bandes, supra note 223.  
 226. See generally AT THE HEART OF THE GOLD: INSIDE THE USA GYMNASTICS 
SCANDAL (S.J. Gibson Films & Sidewinder Films 2019). 
 227. CHANEL MILLER, KNOW MY NAME 230–31 (2019). 
 228. Bandes, supra note 224, at 21. 
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defendant Dzhokhar Tsarnaev after giving testimony, telling 
him that even though he never looked her way, “I realized 
that sitting across from you was somehow the crazy kind of 
step forward that I needed all along.”229 
These dynamics are rarely made explicit to the 
participants themselves. Victims and survivors are 
conscripted to deliver statements at a time of great 
vulnerability and stress, induced by promises about justice 
and closure,230 and one hopes they have been prepared for 
the possibility of disappointment.231 The current pandemic 
squarely presents the question whether physical proximity 
in a public courtroom is a necessary condition for a victim or 
survivor who wishes to make her presence felt and 
communicate her pain. As we’ve discussed above, the lack of 
physical proximity may dissipate some of the immediacy of 
the face-to-face confrontation, reducing the possibility of a 
rich emotional interchange.232 Yet virtual proceedings can 
disinhibit as well as inhibit emotional expression. Though 
the lack of immediacy might feel less immersive to the 
unwilling participant, it might also feel less coercive.233 We 
simply don’t know enough yet about how the move to virtual 
platforms may affect the sorts of strong emotions that 
victims often express at sentencing or that decision-makers 
and others feel when hearing them. In general, although 
we’ve speculated about this in Part I, we don’t yet know how 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. See DOJ guidelines, supra note 215; see also Bandes, supra note 220, at 
16–17. 
 231. There is troubling evidence that this occurs less often than it should. See, 
e.g., Eli Hager, They Agreed to Meet Their Mother’s Killer. Then Tragedy Struck 
Again, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (July 21, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/07/21/they-agreed-to-meet-their-
mother-s-killer-then-tragedy-struck-again# (a powerful account of a restorative 
justice conference gone wrong when the man who murdered their mother broke 
the children’s hearts by deciding on the day of the meeting that he could not 
attend). 
 232. See, e.g., Tait et al., supra note 48. 
 233. See Mulcahy, supra note 124, at 481–82.  
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being on Zoom instead of in a physical courtroom will affect 
participants’ understanding of others’ emotional displays— 
or their absence.234 
Victim impact statements also serve a symbolic function, 
albeit a complex and highly contested one.235 In capital cases, 
the symbolic function is often expressed by prosecutors and 
victim advocates in terms of the importance of honoring the 
victim’s life and publicly respecting the victim’s worth. In 
other types of cases, the function may be different. In the 
Nassar cases, where the crime at issue was sexual assault, 
many of the statements communicated not just the victims’ 
need to face and tame a monster who had loomed far too large 
in their lives, but also the desire to do so in the authoritative 
environment of a courtroom where he was being held 
accountable for his criminal acts. Indeed, the Nassar cases 
exemplify the vexed role of the public courtroom in advancing 
these goals. Judge Rosemary Aquilina drew evident 
satisfaction and widespread praise for her role in comforting 
and empowering the victims throughout the proceedings. 
She “opened her courtroom to any victim who wished to 
speak, for however long she wished to speak,” emphasizing 
the cathartic nature of the speech (“leave your pain here”); 
its public nature (the “whole world” is listening); and its role 
in promoting accountability.236 She also made the victims an 
 
 234. For instance, in the physical courtroom, the defendant who “refuses to 
face” the victim may do so by remaining in what could be construed as a respectful 
posture toward the court, standing or sitting with his body oriented toward the 
bench and his gaze lowered. On Zoom, where everyone’s usual and normative 
body and head position is frontal and facing toward the viewer, the defendant, to 
be seen as refusing to face the victim, would have to turn his body or at least his 
head and shoulders to the side, a more evident rejection of the victim (and of 
virtual courtroom norms). Ironically, though, on Zoom the defendant could 
actually avoid looking at the victim precisely by looking into his laptop camera 
and appearing to look at her. See supra Part I. Thus Zoom creates new 
opportunities for disjunction between expressed and perceived demeanor and 
hence for misunderstanding emotional interactions. 
 235. See, e.g., Bandes, Share Your Grief, supra note 224; Bandes, Victims, 
Closure, supra note 220. 
 236. Scott Cacciola, Victims in Larry Nassar Abuse Case Find a Fierce 
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unusual offer: she would keep her courtroom open to hear 
and respond to additional victim impact statements, even 
though the sentence had been handed down and the case was 
formally over. Although this did not occur, her offer itself 
neatly raises the question: which aspects of the courtroom 
experience would be most important to the victims—
speaking in an imposing, iconic courtroom, a sacred physical 
site at which justice rituals occur; knowing that they were 
participating in an official proceeding on which legal 
consequences hinge; or speaking in the presence (physical or 
virtual) of spectators? Before the pandemic, it was rarely 
necessary to disentangle these elements, but the existence of 
virtual courts, where there is no physical courtroom and no 
public presence of which participants are aware, provides an 
opportunity to do so. 
To examine the importance (or not) of a physically 
present public and, more broadly, the role of spectators 
outside as well as inside the courtroom in furthering the 
values of public trials, we return to the Brock Turner case. 
As noted earlier, Chanel Miller recounted that when she 
delivered her victim impact statement, Turner refused to 
face her.237 Her statement had no discernible impact on 
Turner, who never evinced a satisfying understanding of the 
gravity and the impact of the rape of which he stood 
convicted. Moreover, she (and others) felt that the sentence 
Judge Persky handed down after hearing her statement was 
equally devoid of understanding of the harm Turner had 
caused her. Speaking in a formal courtroom before a judge 
and a live audience did not provide Miller with the healing 
or vindication she may have sought; to the contrary, as she 
recounts: “[w]hen the sentence was announced, the 
immediate reaction I had was humiliation.”238 Healing or 
 
Advocate: The Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/01/23/sports/larry-nassar-rosemarie-aquilina-judge.html.  
 237. See MILLER, supra note 227. 
 238. Ellas Williams, Chanel Miller, Sexual Assault Survivor, On The “Immense 
Relief” of going public, NPR (Sep. 23, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/23/ 
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vindication did not come from the act of speaking alone. It 
required both emotional reactions from others and some 
sense that the legal outcome took her words into account. 
What happened next was unusual. Miller shared her 
victim impact statement with Buzzfeed and it went viral, 
reaching eleven million people within four days.239 At this 
point, the statement’s role in helping Miller heal and, 
perhaps even more dramatically, its role as an instrument of 
public education, became cleanly separated from its role as 
information for the judge. The Buzzfeed statement was 
credited with widely educating the public about the harm of 
what was too often dismissed as “date rape,” evoking 
tremendous empathy for the victims of such crimes. 
Concurrent physical proximity, in this unusual case, turned 
out to be unnecessary to the public education goal of the 
public trial—although it certainly mattered that what Miller 
shared with millions via Buzzfeed she had also declared in 
open court, which imbued it with the cultural significance 
that attaches to formal court proceedings and made Turner’s 
and Persky’s responses part of the lesson. 240 
The Public Beyond the Courtroom 
We have focused in this Section mostly on the complex 
roles of the public present in the courtroom. At least some of 
the goals of the public trial articulated by the Supreme 




 239. The 7,137-word-long victim impact statement by Miller, who was referred 
to in court documents and media reports as “Emily Doe” for the sake of her 
anonymity, was published by Buzzfeed on June 3, 2016, the day after Turner was 
sentenced, and was reprinted in other major news outlets such as The New York 
Times. 
 240. Note that ultimately the judge was recalled, and subsequently fired from 
a job as a tennis instructor based on his ruling in the Turner case. Chris 
Bumbaca, Judge in Brock Turner Case, Aaron Persky, Fired from High School 
Tennis Coaching Gig, USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/sports/2019/09/12/brock-turner-case-judge-aaron-persky-fired-tennis-
coaching-job-lynbrook/2297795001/. 
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trials that the community obtains through the presence of 
the print media, court watchers, and, where allowed, 
cameras in the courtroom. Press coverage and responses via 
comments or letters to the editor provide an outlet for 
concern, hostility, and emotion to a far wider community 
than the few who can fit into the courtroom gallery. The right 
of the press to attend public trials, together with the right of 
assembly, serves as a “catalyst” to the public’s ability to 
exercise its free speech rights regarding the case.241 And of 
course many more people can see justice being done if the 
proceedings are available on television or the Internet and 
not merely open to those in a physical courtroom. 
Trials in physical courtrooms to which the press and the 
public have access can perform these public educational and 
community engagement functions. The victim impact 
statements in the Larry Nassar proceedings, for instance, 
were credited with shining a light on a hidden problem with 
implications far beyond the courtroom—in this case, the web 
of complicity that had protected a predatory doctor for many 
years.242 Where courtroom proceedings are part of a larger 
public relations campaign to achieve policy changes on an 
issue of major importance, such as the litigation against big 
tobacco or against gun manufacturers arising from mass 
shootings,243 the publicity of the litigation is essential for the 
campaign’s efficacy. Yet over the last two centuries, 
courtrooms have allocated less and less space to the press 
and public,244 and in places like the Cook County Criminal 
 
 241. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
 242. This raises a difficult question: whether the sentencing hearing in an 
individual criminal case is the appropriate forum for conducting an essential 
inquiry into layers of complicity and coverups by an interlocking series of 
powerful institutional actors. The fact that an official proceeding should occur 
does not resolve the question of the nature of the forum in which it should occur. 
 243. William Haltom & Michael McCann, Litigation, Mass Media, and the 
Campaign to Criminalize the Firearms Industry, 4 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 
725 (2014). 
 244. MULCAHY, supra note 112, at 83–107. Indeed, “line-standing” for the free 
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Court, as we’ve mentioned, bulletproof Plexiglas further 
impedes the public from being able to see and hear what’s 
going on, while court officials have routinely discouraged 
court watchers.245 
Virtual courts pose additional challenges to the ideals of 
the public trial. Obviously there’s no physical space for the 
press, court watchers, or members of the public to gather and 
observe. Some courts post links to livestreamed proceedings, 
which the public may access from their homes or offices, but 
observers can access only what is visible and audible on the 
interface; as noted earlier, Zoom proceedings include none of 
the offstage behaviors that can, for better or worse, play an 
influential role in the emotional dynamics of the physical 
courtroom. And some courts have apparently been 
restricting access to virtual proceedings.246 All these 
phenomena limit the ability of public trials to serve the goals 
of transparency and accountability. 
Moreover, by inviting the public’s presence, traditional 
courtrooms and courthouses become quintessential public 
things on which a living democracy depends.247 Particularly 
where the litigation is of concern to the community, the 
community wants the proceedings and the judgment to take 
 
but very scarce seats at Supreme Court arguments has become a common 
phenomenon and even a lucrative business. Katie Bart, Courtroom Access: Line-
standing Businesses Save Spots in the Public Line, SCOTUS BLOG (Apr. 15, 2020), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/courtroom-access-line-standing-businesses-
save-spots-in-the-public-line/. 
 245. VAN CLEVE, supra note 216. 
 246. See, e.g., James Lartey, The Judge Will See You on Zoom, but the Public 
Is Mostly Left Out, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/13/the-judge-will-see-you-on-zoom-
but-the-public-is-mostly-left-out; Kevin Penton, Court Accused of Blocking Public 
Access to Trials Amid Virus, LAW360 (June 29, 2020), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1287367/court-accused-of-blocking-public-
access-to-trials-amid-virus.  
 247. BONNIE HONIG, PUBLIC THINGS: DEMOCRACY IN DISREPAIR (2017). “Public 
things are part of the ‘holding environment’ of democratic citizenship; they 
furnish the world of democratic life. They do not take care of our needs only. They 
also constitute us, complement us, . . . and interpolate us into democratic 
citizenship.” Id. at 5. 
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place in a courthouse to which it has access.248 One 
Australian judge has remarked that “the very presence of the 
courts affirm[s] the presence of a community, of a society, by 
reflecting its values back to itself.”249 Hearings and trials at 
designated places known and accessible to the community 
contribute to the community members’ sense of ownership of 
the justice being performed in their name.250 Zoom 
proceedings, by contrast, although convened by the courts 
and possibly decorated with the seals or other symbol of their 
authority, unavoidably drift toward the private sphere—the 
homes or offices from which each participant separately joins 
the meeting and each spectator watches, from his or her own 
laptop or tablet.251 Virtual courts thus become a part of the 
 
 248. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal 
Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (2019) (emphasizing the essential role of “the 
People” generally and courtwatchers as one important representative of The 
People, in protecting communal public interests).  
 249. Rowden & Wallace, supra note 152, at 518. 
 250. Or their sense of alienation from/oppression by it. See VAN CLEVE, supra 
note 216. We would argue that even to the extent that adjudication in a particular 
place and time is deeply flawed, as are the routine hearings in the criminal courts 
van Cleve observed, the very fact that they were taking place in a specific location 
enabled the author to study them more thoroughly (Van Cleve’s work depended 
on the labors of many trained court watchers) and deepens her social critique: 
Everyone in the community, as well as everyone in the relevant legal professional 
community, knew or at least could see and know that injustices were being 
systematically practiced in that courthouse, presenting a more vivid challenge to 
what ought to be our sense of justice. “Public things” are no less public when they 
provoke contestation as well as promoting group identity. HONIG, supra note 247.  
 251. One new source of anxiety for those broadcasting at home is Room Rater, 
the “trendy twitter account that’s rating everyone’s living rooms.” See Heather 
Schwedel, Rating the Trendy Twitter Account That’s Rating Everyone’s Living 
Room, SLATE (Apr. 28, 2020), https://slate.com/human-interest/2020/04/room-
rater-twitter-account-rated.html. The use of home as backdrop raises deeper 
questions about the ways in which social and class cues provided by such 
backgrounds may play on or exacerbate economic, cultural, ethnic and racial 
stereotypes in a setting where legal decisions are being influenced. See, e.g., 
Regina Austin, Documentation, Documentary, and the Law: What Should Be 
Made of Victim Impact Videos, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 979 (2010) (discussing social, 
economic and racial cues in the context of victim impact videos); see also 
Elizabeth Brico, Virtual Hearings Have Created a “Caste System’ in America’s 
Courts, THE APPEAL, (Jul. 31, 2020) (describing the unequal technological 
conditions in various homes: “[W]e’ve got people that are on laptops or desktops, 
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ever-increasing privatization of formerly public life and 
functions which increasingly characterizes our society.252 
Public access to proceedings is crucial, and as we have 
seen, it may be encouraged or discouraged in both physical 
and virtual fora. Virtual courts could ensure broader and 
more reliable access to livestreams. And when they do, public 
access to Zoom proceedings actually offers an advantage over 
access via cameras in the traditional courtroom: it permits 
any member of the audience to observe what the participants 
themselves observe, subject to protecting confidentiality 
when appropriate.253 In a world of mediated proceedings, 
Zoom offers public access that is unmediated by a court 
administrator’s or technology consultant’s decisions about 
where to locate and aim the cameras or a television 
producer’s choices of how to edit the footage.254 In this 
regard, Zoom proceedings may alleviate some of the concerns 
about selective snippets that crop up frequently in 
arguments against cameras in the courtroom.255 In any case, 
 
and are perfectly centered, and the audio is great and everything is perfect. Then 
we have some people that are calling in on their cellphones; then we have some 
people that only call in on their home phone and so suddenly we have this 
different class of people. I can’t help but think of the implicit bias between 
prosecutors and judges and even defenders as to how you look at these people” 
(quoting Rob Mason, director of the juvenile division of the Public Defender’s 
Office in Florida’s Fourth Judicial Circuit)). 
 252. Not to mention that the software itself is privately owned, which means 
that decisions governing its features and uses may be less amenable to 
democratic input and access than is desirable in a public justice system. 
 253. For example, in some circumstances juror anonymity may need to be 
preserved. In addition, Jenia Turner’s survey highlighted a growing concern 
among criminal defense attorneys that their ability to engage in confidential 
attorney-client communications is hampered in virtual settings. See Turner, 
supra note 22 at 57–59. 
 254. So, for instance, the public watching broadcast courtroom proceedings, 
and possibly some members of the public physically present in the gallery, might 
not be able to see clearly those critical interactions we describe above in which 
the defendant turns or doesn’t turn to face the victim and/or the victim’s family 
member(s). On Zoom, whatever courtroom participants themselves see, the 
viewing public sees as well. 
 255. See, e.g., Robert Kessler, Why Aren’t Cameras Allowed at the Supreme 
Court Again?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
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virtual proceedings are here to stay,256 and a legal system 
that does not keep current with modern technology may lose 
the confidence of the public. 257 
What lessons does the possibility of adjudicating without 
a physically proximate public offer for the traditional 
courtroom? At least some of the offstage behavior we now 
take for granted is hard to justify: the sea of blue supporting 
the defendant police officer in an excessive force case, the 
homicide victim’s family and friends sporting buttons with 
his picture on them, and certainly the father of one of Larry 
Nassar’s victims, who, emboldened by Judge Aquilina’s 
message of contempt for Nassar, asked whether he could 
have five minutes alone to inflict punishment on Nassar, and 
then assaulted him.258 We take for granted that criminal 
defendants and even victims will be judged partly by the 
presence and behavior of their family members in the 
 
national/archive/2013/03/case-allowing-cameras-supreme-court-proceedings 
/316876/ (quoting several U.S. Supreme Court justices who have expressed such 
concerns). For example, Justice Kennedy in March 2007 opined that “[i]f you 
introduce cameras, it is human nature for me to suspect that one of my colleagues 
is saying something for a soundbite. Please don’t introduce that insidious 
dynamic into what is now a collegial court.” 
 256. Reed & Alder, supra note 106; see also Madison Alder & Allie Reed, All 
US Appeals Courts Embrace Arguing Streaming Due to Covid, BLOOMBERG LAW 
(Aug. 4 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/all-u-s-appeals-courts-
embrace-argument-streaming-due-to-covid. 
 257. As one New Zealand judge has written: “One must express some concern 
that if the court process is not seen as relevant to modern technologies and 
modern means of communication, where then will lie the respect for the Rule of 
Law?” This judge also posited of “digital natives” (persons born after about 1985) 
in particular: “Their attitude towards the symbolism of the court is that the court 
is a place where the requirement to be physically present at a certain place for 
the disposal of court business may be seen as laughable, particularly when there 
are other systems that are available.” Courts and Covid 19: Delivering the Rule 
of Law in a Time of Crisis, THE IT COUNTREY JUSTICE (Mar. 26, 2020) 
https://theitcountreyjustice.wordpress.com/2020/03/26/courts-and-covid-19-
delivering-the-rule-of-law-in-a-time-of-crisis/.  
 258. Christine Hauser, Victims’ Father Lunges at Larry Nassar in Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/sports/larry-nassar-
father-victims.html. 
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audience.259 The questions about whether the information 
conveyed by the audience is relevant to good judgment are 
not easy ones. As the popular images of iconic courtrooms 
show, the members of the public who are present in court can 
model appropriate emotional responses to the case or display 
more transgressive ones; they can be the eyes and ears for 
the wider community or, through their demeanor, they can 
directly influence the participants. The problem is that these 
sorts of social and emotional dynamics tend to occur below 
the radar; despite important scholarly work on “offstage 
behavior,”260 there is little explicit recognition in the legal 
literature of how the audience affects the proceedings. The 
point here is not to claim that the line between the audience’s 
helpful and harmful effects is easily drawn. Rather it is that 
if offstage behavior does play a useful role, the argument for 
that role ought to be better articulated so it can be 
scrutinized and debated. 
  
 
 259. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Jury As Critic: An Empirical Look at How 
Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 109, 1153 n.99 
(1997) (juror recounting that the presence of the defendant’s uncle in court every 
day, and in the hall of the courtroom reading a Bible, made a deep positive 
impression on him). 
	 260.  See, e.g., Rose & Diamond, supra note 72. 
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CONCLUSION 
The courtroom has long existed as both a physical place 
and as an ideal: an amalgam of values, beliefs, symbols, 
norms, and behaviors that both reflect and shape legal 
practice. In some regards, the courtroom, the jury, and the 
trial have long been objects of study and fascination. Yet the 
courtroom’s deep common-law roots, its mystique, its 
longevity, and the sheer force of the status quo have long 
protected it from the deepest levels of scrutiny—the kinds of 
scrutiny that call into question our abiding faith in the value 
of the open courtroom as a venue for observing demeanor, 
and even the very notion of the “day in court” as a physically 
situated, synchronous event. The sudden prevalence of 
virtual legal proceedings offers a kind of forced natural 
experiment and hence an unprecedented opportunity to 
revisit what we value about adjudication in public 
courtrooms, and to think about how best to ensure that court 
proceedings, whatever form they may take, reflect and 
reaffirm those values. A more critical approach to traditional 
practices and received wisdom can enable us not only to 
sharpen our appreciation for what is worth valuing but also 
to make more informed trade-offs when what we value 
conflicts, as it inevitably does, with competing needs and 
concerns. Our goal in this Article has not been to resolve 
those questions, but to seize the opportunity to ask them, and 
to do so in light of the growing body of social science that can 
help inform our best normative judgments. 
